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I. Introduction
More than ever, the commands of the Fourth Amendment now play a
pivotal role in our everyday lives and affect people from all walks of life.
Apart from law enforcement and the criminal justice system, we are
routinely subjected to the likes of metal detectors and baggage x-rays at
airports, border searches, roadside driver's license inspections, and e-mail
monitoring in the workplace. Our most personal information-such as our
social and financial status, shopping habits, or interests and hobbies-is
constantly gathered and exchanged between governmental and private
entities, and is likely to become even more vulnerable to exploitation as
sophisticated hi-tech equipment becomes widely available and access to
data increases. Some of us may experience many other forms of intrusions
upon our lives driven by race, ethnicity, gender, and class considerations.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Fourth Amendment continues to be a
subject of constant litigation, resulting in a huge and complex body of case
law.
Despite the plethora of precedent and legal scholarship, the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment remains in a constant state of uncertainty and
confusion. One court, for example, has described the law of search and
seizure as "a labyrinth of rules built upon a series of contradictory and
confusing rationalizations and distinctions,"' and Fourth Amendment
scholar Akhil Amar goes so far as to conclude that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment today is an embarrassment.", 2 The question is whether there is
a new way to look at the Fourth Amendment that will eliminate its
entangled state.
1. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 272 (Utah 1985).
2. See Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757
(1994) (later incorporated into AKI-IL R. AMAR, THE CoNrSTITON AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)). Professor Amar explains:
Much of what the Supreme Court has said in the last half century-that the
Amendment generally calls for warrants and probable cause for all searches and
seizures, and exclusion of illegally obtained evidence-is initially plausible but
ultimately misguided. As a matter of text, history, and plain old common sense,
these three pillars of modem Fourth Amendment case law are hard to support;
in fact, today's Supreme Court does not really support them. Except when it
does. Warrants are not required-unless they are. All searches and seizures
must be grounded in probable cause-but not on Tuesdays. And unlawfully
seized evidence must be excluded whenever five votes say so .... The result is
a vast jumble of judicial pronouncements that is not merely complex and
contradictory, but often perverse. Criminals go free, while honest citizens are
intruded upon in outrageous ways with little or no real remedy. If there are




A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment
This article suggests that a critical reexamination of the Fourth
Amendment and its jurisprudence through feminist lenses can shed new
light and add to our understanding of it. These insights, in turn, can and
should generate a positive feminist Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-a
distinctive feminist voice to be integrated systematically into the law of
search and seizure,3 leading to a transformation of the Fourth Amendment
itself. Applying feminist theories to particular issues and normative layers
of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may help guide us through the
more difficult task of imagining a feminist jurisprudence of search and
seizure law.4
A gender-conscious analysis of search and seizure law can uniquely
contribute to the understanding and reconceptualization of the Fourth
Amendment, both as a matter of substance and as a matter of legal
3. Cf Harold H. Koh, Two Cheers for Feminist Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1201
(1993) (discussing the potential contribution of feminist jurisprudence to civil procedure).
4. Cf Roy L. Brooks, Feminist Jurisdiction: Toward an Understanding of Feminist
Procedure, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 318 (1995) (proposing to begin the search for feminist
civil procedure by applying feminist legal theory to the area of personal jurisdiction).
To date, there has not been a fundamental and comprehensive feminist challenge to
the Fourth Amendment. The few examples of a feminist critique of the Fourth Amendment
include Mary E. Becker, The Politics Of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 453-54 (1992) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment neither gives women security in their homes from husbands nor ensures that
the government treats marital rape like other rapes and assaults, as part of a more general
argument that the Bill of Rights does less to solve the problems of women and non-
propertied men than to solve the problems of men of property, especially white men of
property); Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593 (1987) (advocating a relational approach to the
Fourth Amendment doctrines of "standing" and "third-party consent searches"); Rosa
Ehrenreich, Privacy and Power, 89 GEO. L.J. 2047 (2001) (arguing that e-mail monitoring
in the workplace or disclosure of medical information should be regarded as issues of power
and control rather than privacy); Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the Government's Hands off Our
Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy in Cross-Gender Prison
Searches, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861 (2001); Teresa A. Miller, Sex and Surveillance:
Gender, Privacy, and the Sexualization of Power in Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS.
L.J. 291 (2000).
There is, however, some critical race and class oriented scholarship that can
significantly inform a feminist exploration of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Judith G.
Greenberg & Robert V. Ward, Teaching Race and Law Through Narrative, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 323 (1995) (using narratives to question and contextualize color-blind
reasonableness in police-minority encounters); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating Consent from
the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79 (1998) (advocating the
elimination of consent searches during a traffic stop in light of the inherent power disparities
in police-initiated encounters, especially concerning minority drivers); David A. Sklansky,
Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, Sup. CT. REV.
271 (1997); David D. Troutt, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional
Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18 (1999); Robert
V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No
Place for a "Reasonable Person ", 36 How. L.J. 239 (1993).
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discourse. Feminist jurisprudence is centrally concerned with the gendered
underpinnings of legal doctrines and reasoning, with the male standard
implicit in the norms that are central to legal reasoning, and with the
epistemological standpoint from which the law operates, i.e., its purported
"point of viewlessness.",5 The Fourth Amendment provides a rich soil for
such feminist exploration-from its text, to the values it is understood to
embody, to the particular doctrines and epistemology that define its scope
and guide its application in particular cases.
Following feminist inquiries in other areas of the law, this article
seeks to flesh out the invisible biases that underlie the facially objective
and neutral legal standards of search and seizure law. It specifically seeks
to deconstruct the reasonable-unreasonable and objective-subjective
dichotomies that control Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. I aim to
expose the inherent arbitrary and artificial construction of the dichotomous
structure, so that its maintenance can no longer be justified on grounds of
rational, coherent, and bright guidelines. The vast array of Fourth
Amendment case law will provide numerous examples in this process of
deconstruction.
Once the logical and analytical foundations of the dichotomies break
down, feminist theories suggest that the courts maintain the appearance of
rational, natural, and essential dichotomies as a mechanism of perpetuating
patriarchy and the subordination of women and other historically
disadvantaged groups. The Fourth Amendment's overarching standard of
reasonableness and its epistemological stance of objectivity particularly
embody male values and reflect a male perspective. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court's insistence on objectivity and neutrality not only hides the
partiality and perspectivity of its own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
but affirmatively invalidates all other perspectives in a way that
systematically oppresses women and other subordinated members of
6
society.
Notably, highlighting the interrelations of the reasonable-unreasonable
dichotomy and the objective-subjective dichotomy adds another dimension
to the deconstructive process and aids in exposing the power webs that
5. This phrase was coined by Catherine MacKinnon. See, e.g., CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989).
6. My feminist critique of the Fourth Amendment is not limited to exposing the
implications of search and seizure law for women as women. I see it as an essential goal of
any feminist project to address racism, class-bias, heterosexism, and other forms of
oppression as well as male domination. It is an integral part of my ideological and
epistemological feminist commitment. I see the multi-dimensional webs of power and
powerlessness that connect all forms of social and legal subordination; and I believe that
only a feminist theory that aims to acknowledge and dismantle these multiple web-like
structures of domination can improve women's lives and the lives of other oppressed
members of society.
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underlie the Court's jurisprudence. Though analytically distinct, these two
dichotomies are often used interchangeably in Fourth Amendment case law
and are ideologically intertwined with one another. Objective standards are
invoked to construe reasonableness, which in turn aids in our understanding
of objectivity. Thus, reasonableness is spoken of in terms of objective truth
and vice versa. On the other hand, subjectivity-that which embodies
personal, partial perspectives-is implicitly tied with unreasonableness and
often dismissed as untrue. Yet particular subjective viewpoints of those in
power are validated by the legal system. In deconstructing the objective-
subjective dichotomy, this article focuses particularly on the manner in
which the Court consistently empowers the police, both when it ignores
police officers' subjective motivations and when it validates their personal
experiences. At the same time, the Court maintains a male discourse of
objectivity and reasonableness, which serves to subordinate individuals
encountering the police and exclude them from legal discourse and the
criminal justice system.
Having exposed the oppressive fallacy of reasonableness and
objectivity, this article advocates the abandonment of these two concepts.
Instead of reasonableness and objectivity, I look to several possibilities of
modeling a feminist Fourth Amendment by adopting a constantly shifting,
multi-perspectival jurisprudence in substance and in form. Hence, I
displace reasonableness with an anti-subordination principle suited for a re-
envisioned power-centered Fourth Amendment. I discard the abstract
discourse of reasonableness and objectivity in favor of employing a
multifocal approach to Fourth Amendment adjudication, especially by
transcending our conception of how to determine a constitutional violation
and of whose voices should be heard and given preference. I also suggest
we infuse search and seizure law with multiple perspectives of Fourth
Amendment scenarios in the form of personal narratives in order to expand
our basis of knowledge and understanding of multiple and other
perspectives.
Once we train ourselves to see the world through multifocal lenses, we
will be able to overcome many of the traditional objections to the adoption
of contextual and personal standards without sacrificing the integrity of our
legal system. To the contrary, the feminist emphasis on diversity of
(excluded) voices and perspectives, on personal narratives, and on the
importance of eradicating hierarchical power structures provides the initial
tools sufficient to start imagining a different Fourth Amendment and a
better society as a result.
2008
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II. Reasonableness
The concept of reasonableness permeates most Fourth Amendment
doctrines, such as the reasonable expectations of privacy, reasonable
suspicion, and reasonable person standards. More importantly,
reasonableness operates as the overarching norm of the Fourth
Amendment. 7 The Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or
seizures, but only those deemed unreasonable, 8 and reasonableness is set
forth as the ultimate constitutional standard. 9 Reasonableness is both the
substantive command of the Fourth Amendment and its preferred
methodology, and is the meta-narrative of search and seizure law.
Determining the precise meaning of reasonableness, however, has
been an elusive goal. Carol Steiker has observed that no other provision of
the Constitution seems to call so plainly for an open-ended interpretation
and "positively invites constructions that change with changing
circumstances." 10 The Court has similarly held that "[w]hat is a reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula. The Constitution does
not define what are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in our
discipline we have no ready litmus paper test."' 1
Nonetheless, "[t]o say that the search must be reasonable is to require
7. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925); see also, e.g., United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn.,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
9. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001); Bd. of Educ.
of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002);
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855, n.4 (2006); Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S.
398, 402 (2006).
10. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820,
824 (1994). Cf Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(The Fourth Amendment "recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever
changing complexity of human life. It consequently uses the general terms 'unreasonable
searches and seizures."').
11. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 63; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (citing United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)) ("What is reasonable, of course,
'depends on all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the
search or seizure itself.'); Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007) ("[In the end we
must still slosh our way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness."').
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some criterion of reason,"12 for it is no guide for judges or for the police to
say that only an unreasonable search is forbidden. 13 Consequently, various
criteria, such as the warrant requirement, the probable cause requirement,
or the reasonable suspicion requirement, are put forth by the Court as
objective criteria of reason. However, all are vehemently debated in the
Court's jurisprudence and offer no more meaningful guidance than the
concept of reasonableness itself does.
A. Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Threshold Issues of Defining a
Search and Determining Standing
A constitutional scrutiny of the reasonableness of the governmental
conduct begins with an inquiry as to whether this conduct amounts to a
search or a seizure within the scope of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Since the
Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and
seizures, it follows that if a given activity is not a search or a seizure, it is
not covered by the Amendment and does not require a warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion, individualized or other. In fact, it will not
be scrutinized for its reasonableness altogether. 15 We must also determine
whether the police action is a search or a seizure with respect to the
particular person who is raising the Fourth Amendment claim. Only those
individuals whose own rights were implicated by the search or the seizure
have standing to invoke the exclusionary rule or seek civil remedies. 6 The
concept of reasonableness guides both inquiries: A seizure of a person is
determined according to a reasonable person standard,17 and the search and
the standing cases employ a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.' 
8
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court presumably expanded the
protection offered by the Fourth Amendment by declaring that it protects
people, not places.' 9 The Court abandoned its former standard of trespass
and physical intrusion and replaced it with a privacy inquiry. The majority
briefly stated that the government's activities in electronically listening to
and recording the defendant's words spoken into a telephone receiver in a
12. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1968).
13. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 83.
14. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
15. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
16. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978).
17. See Dana Raigrodski, No Reason for the Reasonable Person-Lessons from the
Fourth Amendment, DISORIENT: CRITICAL LEGAL JOURNAL OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript on file with the Texas Journal of Women and the Law).
18. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 137, 148-49; Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980);
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998).
19. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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public telephone booth violated the privacy upon which the defendant
justifiably relied while using the telephone booth, and thus constituted a
"search and seizure" within the Fourth Amendment.2 °  However,
subsequent decisions of the Court cited as the Katz test the two-pronged
analysis that was articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion:
"[F]irst, that the person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. 21 In other words, although an individual might
have a subjective expectation of privacy, that expectation alone is not
enough to establish a constitutionally protected privacy interest. The
individual's expectation must be objectively reasonable if society is to
22
recognize it as legitimate.
In determining the reasonableness of one's expectations of privacy,
the Court relies on allegedly objective distinctions between the private and
public, between the home and public marketplace, and between intimate
details and commercial activity.23 It thus held that none of the following
20. Id. at 353.
21. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court first used the test in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). It has since used several interchangeable variations of the phrase
"reasonable expectation of privacy." See, e.g., United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109,
122-23, n.22 (1984) (using interchangeably the terms "reasonable" and "legitimate" in
regards to the socially recognized expectations of privacy).
22. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 525, n.7 (1984); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
23. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) ("[Olpen fields do not
provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter
from government interference .... Moreover, as a practical matter these lands usually are
accessible to the public and the police in ways that a home, an office, or commercial
structure would not be . . . the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an
expectation that 'society recognizes as reasonable."'); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
34 (2001) ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes ... there is a ready criterion,
with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and
that is acknowledged to be reasonable."); Id. at 37 ("In the home, our cases show, all details
are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.");
United State v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) ("[P]rivate residences are places in which
the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as
justifiable."); Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of
constitutional protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of
our homes during the night."); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding
that while a private home is normally "accorded the full range of Fourth Amendment
protections ... when ... a home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders
are invited for purposes of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no
greater sanctity than if it were carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street.");
Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) ("The greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the fact that the expectation of
privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly
Vol. 17:153
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types of police conduct interfered with expectations of privacy that society
considered reasonable: using undercover agents; 24 removing a paint sample
from a car;25 obtaining bank records; 26 obtaining a list of all outgoing
telephone calls from the phone company;2 using an electronic beeper in a
drum of chemicals to monitor travel on public roads; 28 using a dog sniff to
detect drug odor emanating from luggage 29 or from a vehicle during a
traffic stop; 30 re-opening packages previously opened by a customs agent 3'
or by a private citizen; searching an inmate's jail cell 33 and even a
parolee's home; 34 trespassing on private property beyond the curtilage of
the home,3 5 including peering through a window of a closed barn with a
flashlight after ignoring several fences; 36 moving papers inside a car to
view its VIN; 37 flying airplanes and helicopters over backyards, 38 including
from the sanctity accorded an individual's home."); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725
(1987) ("[T]he privacy interests of government employees in their place of work.., are far
less than those found at home or in some other contexts."); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 90 (1998) (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)) ("Property used for
commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes from residential
property. An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is different from, and
indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home!"); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (holding that one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because "it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A car
has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its contents are in plain view."), affd Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153-
54 (1978); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983); New York v. Class, 475 U.S.
106, 112-13 (1986); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999).
Elsewhere, I have questioned not only the designation of some things as private or
as public, as intimate or as commercial, and so forth, but the utility of these distinctions as
guidance in the construction of reasonableness and of reasonable expectations of privacy in
light of the inherent malleability of such dichotomies and the particular ideology they stand
to serve. See Dana Raigrodski, From Privacy to Power: Toward a New Theory of the
Fourth Amendment, 16 MICH. J. OF GENDER AND L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file
with the Texas Journal of Women and the Law).
24. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
25. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 588, 592-93 (1974) (plurality opinion).
26. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976).
27. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979).
28. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
29. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
30. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837-38 (2005).
31. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 770 (1983).
32. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1984).
33. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984).
34. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846, 851 (2006) (relying on a blanket search
parole condition to hold that a parolee does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy).
35. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
36. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 298 (1987).
37. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986).
38. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (airplane); Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (plurality opinion) (helicopter).
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the taking of aerial photographs with a sophisticated camera; 39 and
rummaging through someone's garbage.40 Absent a reasonable expectation
of privacy, none of these activities constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes and does not have to pass constitutional muster.
On the other hand, using an electronic beeper in a drum of ether to
locate the drum in a private residence; 4' lifting a piece of stereo equipment
to see its serial number;42 squeezing a passenger's bag in the overhead bin
of a bus to detect drugs;4 3 and using thermal imaging to detect heat
emanating from one's home44 infringe on objectively reasonable
expectations of privacy.
The Court also imported the reasonable expectations of privacy
standard into its standing inquiry, using the terms "reasonable" and
"legitimate" interchangeably. In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court held that only
a person whose own legitimate expectations of privacy have been violated
has standing and may invoke the exclusionary rule.45 Since then, in
determining whether a plaintiffs own substantive Fourth Amendment
rights have been implicated, the Court has generally followed and
complimented its narrow and confusing portrayal of privacy expectations in
the search context. The Court has thus held that mere one-time passengers
in a car lack any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove
compartment or area under the seat of the car because these are "areas in
which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a
legitimate expectation of privacy.",46 Similarly, it found that the owner of
drugs found in the purse of his female companion had neither subjective
nor objective expectation of privacy in the purse.4 7 Likewise, a person who
is merely present in a house with the consent of the householder, as
opposed to a social guest, has no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
home, especially if he is there for commercial purposes.
48
The crucial issue in both the standing and definition of a search
contexts is the basis on which some privacy expectations are deemed
reasonable and others unreasonable. The second prong of the Katz test is
meant to reflect societal understandings of reasonableness rather than
39. Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229 (1986).
40. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988).
41. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
42. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987).
43. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000).
44. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
45. 439 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
46. Id. at 148-49.
47. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
48. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998); contra Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.
91, 100 (1990) (a social overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the host's
home).
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personal viewpoints. A footnote in Rakas reaffirmed that the expectations
of privacy must have their source outside Fourth Amendment law. 49 It also
added that any subjective expectations entertained by criminals to keep
their criminal activity undiscovered are not expectations that society
recognizes as reasonable. 0
In order to flesh out societal understandings of the reasonableness of
particular privacy expectations, the Court can rely on both positivist
empirical sources and normative sources.5 1  The cases applying the
reasonable/legitimate expectations of privacy standard have taken,
rhetorically at least, both a descriptive approach (what is the extent of
privacy most people normally expect?) and an aspirational normative
approach (what is the extent of privacy people should have?). Both in
defining a search and in the standing context, the Court has portrayed a
very restricted view of reasonable and legitimate privacy expectations. The
emerging picture of those privacy expectations that are deemed reasonable
is not descriptively accurate or normatively cohesive. Consequently, it
leaves the concept of reasonableness open to debate about its contents.
More importantly though, from a feminist perspective, it leads us to
question the utility and desirability of reasonableness as a legal standard.
An empirical study by Christopher Slobogin and Joseph Schumacher
demonstrates that the Court's holdings do not necessarily reflect actual
societal expectations of privacy.52 Contrary to the Court's holdings, people
ranked government access to bank records and police trespass on private
property as relatively very intrusive, and even rummaging through one's
garbage was ranked as more intrusive than other police conduct that the
Court thought infringed on reasonable expectations of privacy. 3
The Court has not done a better job from a purely normative aspect.
Its holdings lack consistent guidelines and do not convincingly articulate
agreed-upon values justifying its choices.5 4 For example, if the Court's
49. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12.
50. Id.
51. See generally, Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L. J. 19 (1988).
52. Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at
"Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society ", 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993).
53. Id. at 740-4 1.
54. The "Accidental Tourist's Guide to Maintaining Privacy Against Government
Surveillance" illustrates:
To maintain privacy, one must not write any checks nor make any phone calls.
It would be unwise to engage in conversation with any other person, or to walk,
even on private property, outside one's house. If one is to barbecue or read in
the backyard, do so only if surrounded by a fence higher than a double-decker
bus and while sitting beneath an opaque awning. The wise individual might also
consider purchasing anti-aerial spying devices if available (be sure to check the
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reasonableness discourse was to remain consistent with its decision that a
frisk is a search,55 the use of dogs to detect odors on people should also be
regarded as infringing on reasonable expectations of privacy. 56  If
inspections of burned-down houses and residential safety inspections are
considered searches,5 7 so should flying over backyards and rummaging
through garbage left at curbside. 58
Not surprisingly, traditional criticisms abound among Justices 59 and
legal scholars 60 as to the reasonableness of finding a reasonable expectation
of privacy in one case and not in another. Tracey Maclin, for example, has
argued that the Katz test lacks content and substance-at best prone to
circular reasoning and at worst a subjective malleable formula.61
Ironically, Justice Scalia similarly attacked the reasonable expectation of
privacy test as "self-indulgent," because the expectations of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable "bear an uncanny
resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court considers
reasonable.,
62
From a feminist standpoint, having the Justices determine the
reasonableness of one's privacy expectations in light of their own
latest Sharper Image catalogue). Upon retiring inside, be sure to pull the shades
together tightly so that no crack exists and to converse only in quiet tones.
When discarding letters or other delicate materials, do so only after a thorough
shredding of the documents (again see your Sharper Image catalogue); ideally,
one would take the trash personally to the disposal site and bury it deep within.
Finally, when buying items, carefully inspect them for any electronic tracking
devices that may be attached.
Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen? 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1790-91 (1994).
55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
56. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 52, at 755.
57. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (burned-down house); see also
Camara v. Municipal Court of City and Country of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)
(residential safety inspection).
58. Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 52, at 755.
59. In almost every case at least two to four Justices dissent, finding that there is or is
not a reasonable expectation of privacy while the majorities holds to the contrary.
60. See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from
Vagueness Doctrine? 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 (2001); Clark D. Cunningham, A Linguistic
Analysis of the Meanings of "Search" in the Fourth Amendment: A Search for
Commonsense, 73 IOWA L. REv. 541 (1988); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal
Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT.
L. REv. 1 (1986).
61. Maclin adds:
The Court's precedents are not built upon objective legal principles; rather, the
Court's rulings simply reflect the current sentiments of a majority of the Justices
deciding whether a particular police investigative practice is reasonable under
the circumstances. Maclin, supra note 60, at 431.
62. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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conceptualizations of privacy and reasonableness is particularly worrisome
due to the traditional composition of the judiciary. Mary Coombs argues
that both the objective and subjective prongs of the expectation of privacy
standard are sufficiently indeterminate, allowing judges' individual
assumptions about how people do and ought to behave to easily intrude.63
Judges tend to assess these factors through the eyes of someone like
themselves. Most of the Supreme Court Justices are, and always have
been, white, male, and middle to upper class. As a group, they have
particularly experienced and conceptualized individualized privacy. 64 Yet,
such assessments may bear only a tangential relationship to the lives of
those more commonly subject to police investigations.65
More importantly, the elitist composition of the judiciary magnifies
the core concern from a feminist perspective with the use of reasonableness
and the objectivity it connotes as a useful and appropriate legal standard.
This concern cannot be resolved by merely diversifying the judiciary. The
profound controversies over the application of the reasonable expectations
of privacy standard in particular cases reflect fundamental disagreements
over the proper construction of the term "reasonable." Such disagreements,
in turn, serve to undermine altogether the notion of reasonableness as
reflecting some attainable external and objective truth. If anything, they
exemplify the partiality of law and the particular viewpoint it adopts.
Expanding the existing legal discourse to be more inclusive and
sympathetic to perspectives shaped by different life experiences, especially
along the lines of race, gender, and class, is an important goal for feminists
to pursue. Indeed, my own feminist vision of the Fourth Amendment calls
for a discourse of multiple perspectives. 66 From a pragmatic standpoint,
such diversity could result in immediate positive accommodations in search
and seizure law. But accommodations within the existing doctrine leave
the basic jurisprudence of reasonableness and objectivity untouched. They
may even run the risk of perpetuating the normative utility and superiority
of these concepts. By maintaining a discourse of objectivity and reason,
we perpetuate the privileged status assigned to everything which is
stereotypically male and the denigration of that which is stereotypically
female. Consequently, we perpetuate the broader gender hierarchy in
63. Mary I. Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1593, 1594 (1987) (criticizing the Court for its narrow,
individualistic conception of privacy, rooted in the right to exclude others and "to be let
alone," and offering a relational conception of shared privacy within the context of standing
and of third party consent to a search).
64. Cf Anthony Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 404 (1974) ("People who live in single houses or well-insulated apartments tend to take
a rather parochial view of privacy.").
65. Coombs, supra note 63, at 1595 n.9, 1615.
66. See infra Part II.B.3.
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which men dominate women, and deepen the destructive internalization of
subordination and exclusion as acceptable, if not desirable, normative
concepts.
B. "Objective" Criteria of Reasonableness
To hold that the challenged governmental conduct is a search or a
seizure to which the Fourth Amendment is applicable is only to begin the
inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions.67 The lack of
guidance offered by the concept of reasonableness is not limited to the
threshold analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy that defines a
search and determines standing. This lack of guidance is evident
throughout the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence when
reasonableness is used as an overarching norm and in the formulation of
particular legal standards.
In assessing the reasonableness of a search or a seizure, the Court has
advanced several purportedly objective criteria, ranging from a warrant
requirement to a general balancing test. 68 In reviewing these criteria my
purpose is two-fold. First, I question the ability of these criteria to advance
our understanding of the concept of reasonableness and to distinguish
unreasonable searches and seizures from reasonable ones. Moreover, to the
extent that any of these criteria resort to notions of reasonableness in their
definition, it is tautological. Second, it will become clear that none of these
criteria can resolve the reasonableness inquiry alone or in combination.
Both the Justices and traditional Fourth Amendment scholars will concede
that reasonableness is largely a matter of common sense. Therefore, any of
the particular criteria, the overarching concept of reasonableness and the
concept of common sense, are suspect from a feminist perspective because
of their claims to objectivity and universal point of viewlessness. Rather,
they embody the particular and partial privileged perspective of affluent
white men.
1. The Framers' Intent
The Court has often held that the Fourth Amendment should be
construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure
67. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1989); O'Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719 (1987) (plurality opinion); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
337 (1985).
68. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amedment's Concept of
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REv 977 (2004) (arguing that there is a fundamental need for
objective criteria to measure reasonableness).
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when it was adopted. 69 The Court recently reaffirmed that "an examination
of the common law understanding of an officer's authority to arrest sheds
light on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of
what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be
reasonable.,
70
Deferring to the Framers or to common law understandings of
reasonableness, however, only shifts the temporal reference point for
constructing reasonableness. It does not explain the basis on which past
generations distinguished reasonable from unreasonable. David Sklansky
argues that the term "unreasonable" almost always meant in the late-
eighteenth-century what it means today: contrary to sound judgment,
inappropriate, or excessive. 71 These terms-sound judgment,
inappropriate, or excessive-are no less open-ended than the concept of
reasonableness itself and cannot provide us with much needed guidance to
distinguish reasonable from unreasonable government conduct. However,
the association of these terms with the meaning of reasonableness does
serve to partially expose the inevitable resort to value-based, positional
judgments, which are masked by the objective and a-perspectival
appearance of reason and reasonableness.
Justice Scalia's concern with the part of the Court's holding in Terry
v. Ohio approving pat-down searches based on reasonable suspicion
illustrates how constitutional originalism does not escape the core objection
to reasonableness from a feminist perspective. To the contrary, examining
the types of government conduct that were regarded by the Framers as
reasonable or as unreasonable demonstrates the inherent positionality of
reasonableness and exposes the particular elitist viewpoint that has
traditionally shaped reasonableness. According to Scalia, the purpose of
the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is "to preserve
that degree of respect for the privacy of persons and the inviolability of
their property that existed when the provision was adopted-even if a later,
less virtuous age should become accustomed to considering all sorts of
intrusions 'reasonable."'' 72  Consequently, Justice Scalia doubts whether
"the fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would have
allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of being armed and
dangerous, to such indignity., 73
When it came to others, though, the Framers were less virtuous, and
69. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); See also California v. Acevado,
500 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
379-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
70. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001).
71. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1739, 1780-81 (2000).
72. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 380 (Scalia, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 381.
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regarded as "reasonable" all kinds of intrusions upon other people that they
would never have tolerated for themselves. As David Skalnsky points out,
eighteenth century search-and-seizure law was unmistakably elitist, driven
by class and race privilege.74 While American merchants and landowners
objected to virtually any intrusions on their persons or property by officers
of the Crown, they approved of routine arrests of night-walkers; inspections
of the homes of the poor to look for vagrants, poached game, and moral
violations; and in the South, the rounding up by military squads, known as
the slave patrol, of drifters and the routine invasions of "Negro Houses"
and other dwellings that might harbor or provide arms to escaped slaves. 75
Such examples enable us to pierce the veil of objectivity surrounding
the concept of reasonableness. Reasonableness is inherently subjective in
the sense that it is shaped by particular perspectives and experiences.
Furthermore, feminists insist, the law legitimates selective viewpoints,
especially of those privileged by race, class, and gender, while not treating
them as viewpoints at all.76 The historical distance helps us see this
partiality of reasonableness and objectivity and the specific perspectives
they embody. If the Fourth Amendment is to mean anything, we cannot
afford to wait another two centuries before we realize the positionality
inherent in our conceptualizations of reasonableness and objective truth.
2. The Warrant Requirement
Fourth Amendment originalism aside, where the past yields no
answer, the Court will employ traditional standards of reasonableness.77 In
light of the second clause of the Fourth Amendment and its history, the
warrant and probable cause requirements are frequently invoked as
traditional standards of reasonableness. Thus, although the Fourth
Amendment speaks broadly of unreasonable searches and seizures, the
definition of reasonableness turns in part on the more specific commands of
the warrant clause.78
The question of whether the existence of a search or an arrest warrant
is sine qua non to the reasonableness of a search or a seizure arises in light
of the dual clauses of the Fourth Amendment: the reasonableness clause
and the warrant clause. Much of the Court's jurisprudence and Fourth
Amendment academic scholarship has focused on debating this perceived
tension within the Fourth Amendment.79 In any event, even if the Fourth
74. See Sklansky, supra note 71, at 1805-06.
75. Id.
76. See infra Part III.A.
77. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
78. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972).
79. Professors Akhil R. Amar and Tracey Maclin, for example, disagree about whether
Vol. 17:153
A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment
Amendment does not explicitly impose the requirement of a warrant, it is
certainly possible to consider that mandate implicit within the requirement
of reasonableness. 80 Although the Court oscillates between imposing a
categorical warrant requirement and looking to reasonableness alone, for
the most part it has held that warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable. 8' There has been general agreement that "except in certain
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without
proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant., 82  Hence, "the police must, when practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure. 83
Nonetheless, it is not disputed that there can be reasonable searches
without a search warrant. 84 Even the presumption of unreasonableness that
attaches to all warrantless home entries 85 has been called into question, and
the Fourth Amendment embodies a warrant preference, as Maclin argues, or is rather
anchored in a general reasonableness standard, as Amar claims. Cf Akhil R. Amar, Terry
and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1097 (1998); Akhil R.
Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
53 (1996); Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Akhil
R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1178-80 (1991); with
Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness Doctrine? 3
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 (2001); Tracey Maclin, Informants and the Fourth Amendment, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1996); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is
Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning
of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (1993); See also Carol S. Steiker,
Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 825 (1994) ("The modem
Court's (at least occasional) focus on warrants and probable cause as the touchstones of
constitutional 'reasonableness' . . . can and should be defended against the more
freewheeling 'reasonableness' inquiry ... proposed by Professor Amar.").
Amar even argues that warrants were viewed unfavorably, and that the warrant
clause was intended to place limits on the issuance of warrants rather than mandate their
use. Id. See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("The Fourth Amendment does not by its terms require a prior warrant for
searches and seizures; it merely prohibits searches and seizures that are 'uneasonable.'
What it explicitly states regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather
than requirement of their use, for the warrant was a means of insulating officials from
personal liability assessed by colonial juries.").
80. See, e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 582 (Scalia, J., concurring).
81. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
82. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 (1973); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506 (1978).
83. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
84. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950); see also Brigham City, Utah
v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402 (2006) ("Because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is 'reasonableness', the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.").
85. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-50 (1984); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); Brigham City, Utah, 547 U.S. at 402 (2006).
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the "firm line [drawn] at the entrance to the house 86 has been blurred.87
The Court insists, though, that the cardinal principle that searches
conducted without a judicial warrant are per se unreasonable is subject only
to a "few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions., 8 8  In
reality, the warrant requirement has become so riddled with exceptions that
it is unrecognizable. There are some twenty exceptions including searches
incident to arrest, automobile searches, stop and frisk searches, plain view
searches, consent searches, border searches, administrative searches of
regulated businesses, exigent circumstances, welfare searches, inventory
searches, airport searches, school searches, searches of mobile homes, and
searches of offices of public employees.89 Seizures such as arrest outside
of the home, on-the-street investigative stops, or brief detentions at fixed
sobriety or border checkpoints are likewise exempt from the warrant
requirement. 90
Reasonableness continues to play a role even in those instances where
a warrant makes the search or the seizure presumptively reasonable. First,
the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that the warrant
particularly describe the place to be searched and the people or things to be
seized as well as supported by oath or affirmation. 91 Both requirements, in
turn, are based on the facts as the officer reasonably believes them to be.
Second, the execution of the warrant itself must not be unreasonable. In
what has become standard circular reasoning in the Court's Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court held in Hicks v. Arizona that any operational
necessities to conduct a search must be reasonably related to the scope of
86. Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90.
87. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985) (approving warrantless search
of mobile home); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) (approving warrantless protective
sweep of home during in-home arrest); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)
(validating warrantless home search based on apparent authority of a third party to consent
to the search), But cf Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (holding warrantless search
unreasonable as to defendant physically present and expressly refusing consent).
88. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385,
390 (1978) (citing Katz); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991). See, e.g., Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk searches); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234
(1968) (plain view searches); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (motor vehicle
searches); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (searches incident to arrest);
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 443 (searches under exigent circumstances); and Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (searches based on consent).
89. See generally Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH.
L. REv. 1468 (1985); Craig M. Bradley, The Court's "Two Model" Approach to the Fourth
Amendment, Carpe Diem!, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1993); Craig M. Bradley &
Joseph L. Hoffmann, "Be Careful What You Ask For": The 2000 Presidential Election, The
U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76 IND. L.J. 889 (2001); See also,
e.g., Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 581-82 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
90. Id.
91. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
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the search warrant for it to be considered a reasonable search. 92  It
thereafter relied on this holding to determine that a media ride-along in
executing a warrant in a home violated the Fourth Amendment because the
presence of the media was not in aid of the warrant's execution. 93 The
Court reasoned that police actions in the execution of a warrant must be
("reasonably" is implied) related to the authorized objectives of the warrant
and entrance into the home.
94
The Court also considered whether this reasonableness requirement
imposes a "knock and announce" duty on the police when executing a
search warrant of a home. First, the Court held, without specifying, that
depending on the circumstances, an officer's unannounced entry into a
home might be either unreasonable or reasonable. 95 Later, it sanctioned a
warrant that preemptively exempted the police from announcing their
presence prior to entry (a "no-knock" warrant), reasoning that the police
did not have to announce their presence if they had a reasonable suspicion
that doing so would be dangerous, futile, or would inhibit the effective
investigation of the crime. 96 When the reasonableness of the police conduct
is determined by employing a standard defined itself by a notion of
reasonableness, the standard rings hollow. 97 This is even more true where
the reasonable suspicion standard is employed as the sole criterion for
reasonableness rather than the warrant and probable cause requirements.
98
3. Probable Cause
When a warrant is issued, the warrant clause imposes a probable cause
requirement.99 However, when a warrant is not required, textually,
probable cause is not invariably required either.1 00 Nonetheless, the Court
initially maintained that, regardless of a warrant, searches and seizures
92. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
93. Wilson v. Lane, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
94. Id. at 604 (citing Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325).
95. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995).
96. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 67-68 (1998); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 589-90 (2006).
97. In fact, the Court seems to have discarded whatever little guidance was meaningful
in using a reasonable suspicion standard to evaluate the reasonableness of the officers'
unannounced entry to execute a search warrant. In Hudson, the Court held that a violation of
the knock and announce rule, regardless of the existence of any such reasonable suspicion to
justify the officers action, does not warrant suppression of evidence found as the appropriate
remedy. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599. The decision hence suggests that the Court views the
knock-and-announce rule with less importance, and in facts shields unannounced entries to
execute a search warrant as per se reasonable.
98. See infra Section 4.
99. U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
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should be based on probable cause in order to be deemed reasonable. 1°
Thus, probable cause serves as a criterion of reasonableness for warrantless
arrests outside of the home, or for the exigent circumstances and
automobile exceptions to the warrant requirement. However, the Court has
not only chipped away at the probable cause requirement, but has defined
the standard in a way that does not substantially advance our understanding
of reasonableness.
Probable cause is usually thought of in terms of statistical
probabilities. Essentially, though, it is a flexible, common sense
standard. 102 The Court emphasizes that "[1]ong before the law of
probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated certain
common sense conclusions about human behavior." 103 Hence, the probable
cause standard merely requires that the facts available to the officer would
cause a "man of reasonable caution" to believe that the items sought are
contraband or evidence of a crime. 104 Defined in that manner, one might
wonder what differentiates probable cause from the supposedly less
stringent standard of reasonable suspicion often used by the Court as a
substitute for the probable cause standard. Grounding both standards in
notions of common sense and in the conclusions reached by reasonable
people will require us to investigate what qualifies as common sense and
how certain conclusions about human behavior are reached. 
105
4. Reasonable Suspicion and General Interest Balancing
As with the warrant requirement, the Court made it clear that probable
cause is not synonymous with reasonableness. Sometimes a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing will suffice, and sometimes no suspicion at all is
required for the search or seizure to be reasonable. These options became
acceptable due to a fundamental change in traditional Fourth Amendment
analysis that took place in the late 1960s. In two close cases, the Court
significantly shifted the focus of Fourth Amendment inquiry. 106 First, it
openly acknowledged the central place of reasonableness rather than
warrants and probable cause. Second, the Court developed a general
balancing test as the ultimate criterion for Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.
101. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925) (probable cause is
"reasonableness" standard for warrantless searches and seizures).
102. Id. at 161; Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983); See also Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 230, 238 (1983) (characterizing the determination of probable cause as a
practical matter of common sense).
103. Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)).
104. Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
105. See infra Part I.C.
106. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Vol. 17:153
A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment
The facts of both cases presumably had limited applicability but
expanded the protections of the Fourth Amendment to cover thus far
unregulated government activity. 107 However, these cases' implications for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence were far-reaching. The Court has since
made it clear that the Fourth Amendment test is whether the governmental
intrusion is reasonable based upon a balancing of the government's need to
engage in the intrusion against the individual's privacy interests. 108
This shift in the Court's jurisprudence has only aggravated the
problematic use of reasonableness from a feminist perspective. Both the
reasonable suspicion standard and the general interest-balancing framework
clearly demonstrate the main themes of my critique. First, despite their
purported objective normative guidance, the reasonable suspicion standard
and the interest-balancing framework do not provide us with a meaningful
guide to differentiate reasonable suspicions from unreasonable ones.
Second, both rely on common sense "knowledge," which in itself lacks any
guidance, and rather than being objective and universal embodies a
privileged white male perspective. Finally, like the previous criteria of
reasonableness and common sense, both the reasonable suspicion standard
and the interest-balancing scheme mask their inherent perspectivity behind
a facade of objectivity and point of viewlessness.
In Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 109 the Court took the
first step towards shifting traditional Fourth Amendment analysis away
from the warrant and probable cause requirements to a general balancing
inquiry. At first, it concluded that administrative searches by municipal
health and safety inspectors for housing code violations constituted
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and that such searches, when authorized and conducted
without a warrant procedure, lacked traditional Fourth Amendment
safeguards. "0 The Court went on to say, however, that these conclusions
must not be the end of its inquiry."' Reasonableness, the Court held, was
still the ultimate standard." 2 Eventually, "there can be no ready test for
107. Camara dealt with routine inspections for housing code violations, and Terry
addressed the police practice of stop and frisk during street encounters with individuals.
Camara, 387 U.S. at 523; Terry, 392 U.S. at 1.
108. See, eg,, Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989);
Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337, 342 n.8 (1985); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
652-54 (1995); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001); Bd. of Educ. of Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825 (2002); Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006); Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1778 (2007).
109. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
110. Id. at534.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 539.
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determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."' 3 As opposed to a search
pursuant to a criminal investigation, the reasonable goal of enforcing the
housing code justified conducting periodic routine area inspections even
absent individual probable cause to search a particular dwelling. 1
4
Quoting Camara,'15 the Court expressly imported the balancing
analysis into the context of criminal investigations in Terry v. Ohio,
decided the following year. " 6 In Camara, the balancing analysis resulted
in approval of a search based on non-particular probable cause. In Terry,
the balancing analysis led to the substitution of a reasonable suspicion
standard for the usual probable cause requirement. The Terry Court had to
assess for the first time the reasonableness of on-the-street police-citizen
encounters and the police practice of stop and frisk. While finding that an
investigative stop constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure, and that a pat-
down frisk was a Fourth Amendment search, the Court held that neither a
warrant or probable cause were required for either. Instead, it accepted
reasonable suspicion as the new threshold of constitutionality. 1
7
Hence, "in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.""
8
The officer's suspicion, though, is judged against an objective standard:
would the facts "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
action taken was appropriate." 19 Simple good faith on behalf of the officer
is not enough; she must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and
unparticularized hunch of criminal activity. 20  Consequently, the Court
held that a police officer could conduct a warrantless investigative stop of a
citizen based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot. 12 That same officer, based on a reasonable suspicion that the
citizen may be armed and dangerous, could conduct a pat-down frisk of the
citizen's outer clothing. In the context of the latter, a reasonable suspicion
requires that "a reasonable prudent man in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others would be in
danger."1
22
While the Court has acknowledged that the concept of reasonable
113. Id. at 536-37.
114. Id. at 536-38.
115. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 27.
118. Id. at21.
119. Id. at21-22.
120. Id. at 22, 27; See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1979).
121. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
122. Id. at 26.
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suspicion is somewhat "abstract"' 123 and "elusive,"124 it has deliberately
avoided reducing it to "a neat set of legal rules."'125 To the contrary, the
Court has maintained that the concept of reasonable suspicion is one of the
relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment.1 26  I
disagree. As defined, the reasonable suspicion standard is circular and does
not provide a meaningful guide to differentiate reasonable suspicions from
unreasonable ones. Although reasonable suspicion is regarded as a less
demanding standard than probable cause, it at least requires a minimal level
of objective justification. 127 Such objective justification, we have seen,
may arise upon specific facts and rational inferences from them. These
facts and inferences must reasonably warrant the intrusion, as opposed to
hunches that are insufficient. What exactly would make an inference
rational as against a mere hunch? What facts reasonably warrant the
intrusion as against facts on which it is unreasonable to warrant the
intrusion?
In subsequent cases, the Court has stated that a police officer is
entitled to rely on common sense inferences about human behavior, so long
as those inferences establish a particularized and objective basis for the
establishment of reasonable suspicion. 128 The Court was also clear that law
enforcement agents may, and should, rely on their experience in making
such inferences. Those inferences, including ones based on perceptions of
seemingly innocent facts, should be given due deference because of the
unique law enforcement experience of police officers and government
agents. 129 These doctrinal "clarifications," however, do not provide us with
better guidance to understand which inferences would give rise to an
objectively reasonable suspicion.
Sheri Lynn Johnson has pointed out the amazing variety of innocuous
human behavior that experienced officers regard as suspicious.' 30  She
demonstrates how the police have inferred an attempt to conceal criminal
activity both from a traffic violator's reach toward the dashboard or floor of
a car, and from her alighting from the car and walking toward the police. 1
31
Drug Enforcement Agency officers have inferred a desire to avoid
123. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002).
124. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981).
125. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-696
(1996)).
126. Id. (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8).
127. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
128. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418; See also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 124-25
(2000).
129. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
130. Sheri L. Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214
(1983).
131. Id. at 219.
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detection both from a traveler's being the last passenger to get off a plane
and from him being the first.1 32 INS agents have concluded that it was
suspicious that the occupants of a vehicle reacted nervously when a patrol
car passed, and also that it was suspicious that the occupants failed to look
at the patrol car or were just "excessively" calm.' 33  It seems that a
seasoned officer can interpret almost any conduct as suspicious, and given
the Court's deference to the officers' inferences almost anything can be a
reasonable suspicion. What qualifies each suspicion as objectively
reasonable remains a mystery.
The impact of the reasonable suspicion standard and the overall
analytical framework of interest-balancing would not have been that far-
reaching had the Court's subsequent cases stayed true to the rhetoric and
reasoning of Terry. In applying a balancing test and evaluating the proper
extent of governmental intrusion, the Terry Court emphasized the limited
nature of the stop and frisk intrusions in place, time, scope, and purpose.
Hence, the less demanding reasonable suspicion standard probably was
considered constitutionally adequate in light of the particular circumstances
involved in Terry.' 34 However, Terry's broad implications became clear as
subsequent cases disregarded these limiting circumstances and applied the
balancing analysis and reasonable suspicion standard in various settings
entailing more significant intrusions.
The Court extended the reasonable suspicion standard to motor
vehicle stops,135 including a frisk of the vehicle's interior, 136 to protective
sweeps of homes following an in-home arrest,1 37 and even to warrantless
searches of probationers' homes on suspicion of criminal activity.
38
Detention no longer had to be brief once the Court approved of a prolonged
detention (over 16 hours) of a traveler at the border to dispel a reasonable
suspicion that she smuggled drugs in her body cavities. 139 Police officers
performing a Terry pat-down search can seize discovered items they
reasonably suspect are contraband, even though the items pose no threat of
132. Id. at 219.
133. Id. at219-20.
134. Terry involved a detention on the street for a brief investigative questioning to
dispel suspicion of present or future criminal activity, and a pat-down search of the outer
clothing of the individual suspected of being armed and dangerous in order to detect the
weapons for the officer's protection. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
135. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
136. Id. at 1051.
137. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990) (held that officers may conduct a
limited protective sweep if they have a "reasonable belief based on specific and articulable
facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.").
138. United States v. Knight, 534 U.S. 112, 121-22 (2001).
139. See United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
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danger. 140 And in New Jersey v. TL.O, the Court approved a full-blown
search of a student's personal belongings based on reasonable suspicion
she violated or was violating the law or the school's rules. 141
Even the requirement that the suspicion be particular and
individualized for it to be deemed "reasonable" has been severely
undermined. Although in Terry the Court adopted a balancing analysis as
the ultimate measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, it maintained
the premise that "a search ordinarily must be based on individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing."142 Yet subsequent cases have made it clear that
some searches and seizures may be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment without any individualized suspicion. 143  For example, the
Court has upheld certain regimes of suspicionless searches where the
program was designed to serve "special needs beyond the normal need for
law enforcement." 144 It has also approved of suspicionless searches of
pervasively regulated industries for certain administrative purposes, 45 and
condoned suspicionless brief seizures at fixed sobriety 146 and border
patrol 147 checkpoints designed to combat drunk driving and intercept illegal
immigrants respectively.
In these cases, several factors in the balancing analysis combined to
justify the search or seizure absent an individualized suspicion. On the one
hand, the Court characterizes the governmental interest as administrative in
nature or grounded in special needs beyond regular (criminal) law
140. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373 (1993).
141. New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325,341-42 (1985).
142. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997). Indeed, even in T.L.O., where the
Court approved a search of a student's purse as a result of balancing the special needs of
school authorities with the diminished privacy expectations of children at school, it did so in
light of the individualized suspicion that the particular student was violating school rules
concerning cigarettes. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
143. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 ("The touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion ... although this Court
has only sanctioned suspicionless searches in limited circumstances, namely programmatic
and special needs searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances
in which search absent individualized suspicion could be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.").
144. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002) (suspicionless drug testing of all students who participate in
competitive extracurricular school activities is constitutional); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (random drug testing of certain student athletes is reasonable
without any particularized showing of suspicion); Nat'l Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding suspicionless drug tests for U.S. Customs Service
employees seeking transfer or promotion to certain positions); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug and alcohol tests for railway
employees involved in train accidents or in violation of safety regulations).
145. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987).
146. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990).
147. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
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enforcement. On the other hand, turning again to the reasonable
expectations of privacy standard, it portrays the individual's privacy
interest as limited or diminished. 48  Set up against each other, the
administrative interest/special need of the government outweighs the
privacy interest of the individual, leading the Court to characterize the
intrusion upon the individual as minimal. Consequently, the individual is
granted a lesser procedural protection from the intrusion by the
government.
To date, the Court has not directly condoned suspicionless searches or
seizures for overtly criminal law enforcement purposes, but it has come, at
least for all practical purposes, very close. Initially, the Court approved
such searches only in the administrative context. Hence, in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond,149 the Court struck down suspicionless drug
interdiction checkpoints as unconstitutional, distinguishing them from
sobriety or border checkpoints because their primary purpose was to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. 50 The Court was
particularly reluctant to recognize exceptions to the general requirement of
individualized suspicion where governmental authorities primarily pursue
their general crime control ends:' 5' "Without drawing the line at
roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control,
the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from
becoming a routine part of American life." 
1 52
The distinction between "special needs beyond the normal need for
law enforcement" and general crime control purpose was also significant to
the holding of the Court in Ferguson v. Charleston.153 In this case, the
Court held that both the nonconsensual drug testing of urine samples of
pregnant patients in the hospital and the reporting of positive test results to
the police were unreasonable searches. In reaching this conclusion, the
148. The Court completes a full circle in its jurisprudence of reasonableness when it re-
uses the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' standard to conclude that the individual has
only a diminished expectation of privacy, which accordingly deserves lesser procedural
protections. For example, the Court sanctioned the warrantless, suspicionless drug and
alcohol testing of railway employees, in part on the ground that "the expectations of privacy
of covered employees are diminished by reason of their participation in an industry that is
regulated pervasively to ensure safety." See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 627 (1989). Likewise, in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court balanced the strong legitimate
security interest of the prison against the inmates diminished expectation of privacy (upon
incarceration) and concluded that neither searches of the inmates' rooms nor body-cavity
searches required any individualized suspicion or were otherwise unreasonable. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557, 560 (1979).
149. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
150. Id. at 40-42.
151. Id. at 43.
152. Id. at 42.
153. 532 U.S. 67(2001).
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Court emphasized the law enforcement's purpose of collecting evidence of
drug use, which was meant to coerce the women into drug treatment.'54
While the outcomes of these two cases favor the individual, the Court's
opinions demonstrate the malleability of the criminal-civil distinction, and
consequently undermine it.
There are several reasons to criticize the criminal-civil line in the
context of the Fourth Amendment. '55 First, the Fourth Amendment applies
equally to civil and criminal law enforcement. Its text speaks to all
governmental searches and seizures, and its history is not uniquely bound
up with criminal law.' 56 Second, in many cases, the purpose behind the
governmental search or seizure can be easily characterized as either civil,
criminal, or both. 157 Third, if two searches are equally unintrusive to the
target, especially if the search suspect is not suspected of a crime, it is
unclear why the criminal search should be more severely restricted than the
civil search. 158 The expanding powers of the modern administrative state
make civil searches and seizures no less intrusive and subject to potential
abuse of state power. Finally, the Court is expressing a white, privileged,
male perspective when it views some administrative searches as involving
minor intrusions on one's privacy. For example, I doubt whether poor
minority women who are welfare recipients share the Court's view of the
"limited" intrusion into their lives caused by frequent and suspicionless
welfare searches. Hence, if administrative searches may be "reasonable"
absent particular individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, there is nothing
inherently unreasonable in suspicionless searches for traditional criminal
law enforcement purposes.
Like Edmond and Ferguson, the malleability of the criminal-civil
distinction was evident in the Court's most recent cases regarding
warrantless home searches of a probationer159 and a parolee 60 respectively.
In contrast to Edmond and Ferguson, the civil "special needs" backdrop of
the probation and the parole no doubt served to undermine the otherwise
traditional law enforcement nature of the police action under the
circumstances. The Court, however, structures its holding so that they do
not have to confront this question directly. First, in United States v.
154. Id. at 80-86.
155. See generally Amar, supra note 2.
156. Id. at 758-59 (placing the Fourth Amendment in criminal procedure distorts search
and seizure law and causes us to give short shrift to the following questions: How should
searches and seizures outside the criminal context be constitutionally regulated? Or what
makes a search or seizure substantively unreasonable?).
157. Id. at 770 ("[A]ren't metal detectors there to detect and deter crimes like attempted
hijacking?").
158. Id.
159. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).
160. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006).
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Knights, the Court found that a probationer's severely diminished
expectation of privacy due to a blanket search condition in the probation
order,' 6' combined with the police officer's actual individualized
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was taking place, 62 justified
deviating from the probable cause and warrant requirements and held the
search reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 163 Not
only was the probation search condition a "salient circumstance" in finding
that a probationer has a significantly diminished expectation of privacy,' 64
but the Court seemed to have accepted that the Fourth Amendment does
not limit searches based on a probation condition to those with
"probationary" purposes. 165
The Knights Court was not required to address the constitutionality of
a suspicionless search based on a probation condition because the search in
that case was supported by reasonable suspicion. Hence, the Court left open
the question of whether a probation condition so diminishes or even
eliminates a reasonable expectation of privacy, that a search without
individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.166 When it did have to address that
question, in the case of Samson v. California, the Court avoided directly
answering the question of whether individualized suspicion will no longer
be needed for traditional law enforcement searches, at least for Terry stops
outside of the home, by holding that a parolee has no legitimate expectation
of privacy. 1
67
It is not clear whether the Court is fully aware of the implications of
its holding. By finding no legitimate expectation of privacy, the Court in
fact characterizes the encounter as a non-search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. As such, it is not at all subject to reasonableness
scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, 168 regardless of whether it is
characterized as administrative or special needs in nature, regardless of the
government's professed interest, and even regardless of the extent of
intrusion by the police. Nonetheless, the Court's analysis conflates the
161. Knights, 534 U.S. at 119-20.
162. Id. at 115-16.
163. Id. at 122.
164. Id. at 118-20.
165. Id. at 116.
166. Id. at 120 n.6.
167. 547 U.S. 843, 855 (2006). In this case, the officer observed Samson walking down a
street with a woman and a child. Based on prior contact, the officer knew Samson was on
parole and believed there was an outstanding parole warrant against him. The officer
stopped Samson, which denied such warrant, and also confirmed by radio that there was no
outstanding warrant. Nevertheless, based on Samson's status as parolee, the officer searched
Samson and found methamphetamine. Id. at 846.
168. See supra Part II.A.
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threshold question of defining a search with the constitutional examination
if reasonableness, to suggest that the Court may not have intended to go
that far. 1
69
Whereas Knights and Samson may arguably be limited in scope due to
the unique status of probationers and parolees, the Court's decision in
Illinois v. Caballes170 came very close to undoing what limited protection
is afforded by the reasonable suspicion standard in criminal investigations.
As you recall, in 2000 the Edmond Court struck down suspicionless drug
interdiction checkpoints.171 However, the holding of Caballes offers the
police a way around Edmond. In the same way that the police have been
widely using legal traffic stops to then obtain the consent of the individual
to search the vehicle for drugs or firearms, a search which in itself would
not be further subjected to reasonableness scrutiny, 72 it now seems that the
police can formally rely on legal traffic stops to then conduct widespread
dog sniffs of vehicles (and possibly even persons) or other "non-search"
activities to jump start a criminal investigation.
In Caballes, a state police trooper stopped Roy Caballes for driving 71
miles per hour in a 65 miles per hour speed zone. The trooper radioed the
police dispatcher to report the stop but requested no assistance. A second
trooper, a member of the drug interdiction team, heard about the traffic stop
over the radio, and decided to come to the scene to conduct a dog sniff.
While the first trooper was still writing the ticket, the second one walked
the dog around the car and was alerted to drugs in the trunk of the car,
which were consequently introduced as evidence in trial. Ironically,
Caballes refused earlier the first trooper's request for his consent to search
the car. 173 The Court held that the initial seizure was legally based on
probable cause and was not unduly prolonged by the dog sniff. 174 The dog
sniff itself did not infringe on any legitimate expectation of privacy and
therefore was not a search subject to the Fourth Amendment. 175 Hence, the
reasonableness scrutiny did not extend to police conduct that followed the
initial justified traffic stop, although the nature of the investigation no
169. In the footnote to its holding that Samson had no legitimate expectation of privacy,
the Court states that "[b]ecause we find that the search at issue here is reasonable under our
general Fourth Amendment approach," there is no need to reach the issue of consent.
Samson, 547 U.S. 843, 852 n.3. The dissenting Justices, Stevens, Souter and Breyer,
criticize the majority for its faulty syllogism and circular reasoning ("[T]he Court two-steps
its way through a faulty syllogism and, thus, avoids the application of Fourth Amendment
principles altogether."). Id. at 860.
170. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
171. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
172. See Section E. infra and accompanying notes.
173. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 418 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 408.
175. Id. at 408-09.
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doubt shifted and with it the potential for misuse of police power.
As the dissent notes, however, introducing an intimidating drug-
detecting dog into a traffic stop can in fact be quite intrusive. 176 It therefore
justifies critically re-examining the previous characterization of dog-sniffs
as neither a search nor a seizure; and once seen as the Fourth Amendment
search that it is in practice, the unwarranted and nonconsensual expansion
of the routine traffic stop to a drug investigation is not reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 177 In contrast, the Court's decision
clears the way for suspicionless dog-led drug sweeps of parked cars,
motorists waiting at a red light, and simply pedestrians on the street-
something before reserved primarily for security measures at airports and
border crossings. 178
Only time will tell whether the Court will decide to eliminate the
reasonable (individualized) suspicion criterion altogether. There is nothing
in the Court's concept of reasonableness to prevent it from doing so. Nor is
there anything in the interest-balancing scheme that requires police to have
a particular suspicion in order to justify searches and seizures for traditional
criminal law enforcement purposes. In our day, it is not hard to imagine
instances where the governmental interest in crime prevention and
detection will be seen as more important when balanced against the
individual interest in being secure from governmental intrusions, so that no
suspicion at all will be constitutionally required.
The indeterminacy of the balancing framework, including the
uncertain role of the requirement for a particular suspicion, is related in part
to the use of common sense cognition in the Court's balancing analysis.
Unlike its pronouncements in relation to probable cause and reasonable
suspicion, the Court's balancing rhetoric does not refer directly to common
sense. Still, common sense seems to influence the Court's characterization
of the interests that are relevant to its inquiry and the actual balancing of
these interests against each other. We should be critical of this indirect use
of common sense within the balancing analysis because, as I will argue in
Part 1II, it unconsciously and indiscriminately legitimizes the preferences
and interests of those who have been socially empowered.
More importantly, though, is that any balancing of interests is
inherently a matter of values and policies. Such a value-laden legal
framework more truthfully captures the role of law and the Court in society
compared to the artificial stance of objectivity currently cloaking
adjudication. 179  Nonetheless, it is time for the Court to acknowledge
176. Id. at 421-22 (Ginsburg J., dissenting), 411 n.2 (Souter J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 421-22 (Ginsburg J., dissenting), 411 (Souter J., dissenting).
178. Cf Id. at 421-22 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
179. Part of the reluctance of the Supreme Court Justices to see themselves as playing
out competing values has to do with separation of powers, and the belief that, from a
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openly the value-laden basis of its jurisprudence, and to be conscious and
critical of the sources of its values and the process for choosing among
them.
5. Consent
The last criterion of reasonableness is the Court's use of consent as a
measure of the reasonableness of the search or the seizure. Traditionally, a
search based on consent has been viewed as one of the specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.'8 0
However, the consequences of consent to a search are much broader than
merely excusing the police from having to obtain a warrant. Absent
coercion, searches based on consent are per se reasonable regardless of the
practicability of obtaining a warrant or the existence of any suspicion of
misconduct. 18 1  Moreover, in a consent case the Court will not even
examine the balance struck between the individual's privacy interest, the
intrusion upon that interest, and the governmental interest. Practically
speaking, a search based on consent is immunized from constitutional
review.
Rather than being confined to limited exceptional circumstances,
obtaining the individual's consent to a search has become a widely
practiced investigative tool used by the police. Since the Court deems the
individual's consent to be voluntary, except in extreme cases, and since it
does not question the reasonableness of the search any further once
voluntary consent is established, many of the searches conducted by the
police go unregulated and remain beyond the purview of serious judicial
scrutiny. In light of the power hierarchy between the police and the
citizenry, the use of consent to justify searches and seizures is highly
questionable. Combined with the fact that consent is used as a
determinative factor of the reasonableness of the search or the seizure, the
result is a significant erosion of the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. 1
82
democratic point of view, policies should be decided by the legislature and not by the
courts. Even if we accept this narrower vision of the judicial role, reality is such that many
policy issues are not resolved by the legislature and yet require immediate attention and
solutions. Thus, the Court in many, if not most, instances is faced with having to set the
policy rather than implementing pre-existing legislative policy. This is especially so with
regards to constitutional questions.
180. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
181. Id.
182. For a critique of the use of consent in search and seizure law see Dana Raigrodski,
Consent Engendered: A Feminist Critique of Consensual Fourth Amendment Searches, 16
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 37-62 (2004).
2008
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
6. Conclusion
Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that all of the proposed
criteria can guide the construction of reasonableness, it is clear that none of
them fully encapsulate the meaning of reasonableness within the Fourth
Amendment. The Court has acknowledged as much in the following
passage from Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, in which it
summarized the analytical framework of the reasonableness inquiry:
[T]he ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental
search is "reasonableness" . . . where there was no clear practice,
either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at
the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a
particular search meets the reasonableness standard is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests .... [R]easonableness generally requires the obtaining
of a judicial warrant... [with] the showing of probable cause
required by the Warrant Clause. But a warrant is not required to
establish the reasonableness of all government searches; and
when a warrant is not required probable cause is not invariably
required either. A search unsupported by probable cause can be
constitutional.. .when special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable .... [W]e approved [a school search
that] while not based on probable cause was based on
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. As we explicitly
acknowledged, however, the Fourth Amendment imposes no
irreducible requirement of such suspicion.'83
If "neither a warrant nor probable cause nor, indeed, any measure of
individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of
reasonableness," 184 what gives reasonableness (or the balancing test) its
content? What, essentially, guides us?
C. Reasonableness and Common Sense
Traditionally, reasonableness is largely a matter of common sense.' 
85
As the Court in United States v. Sharpe states, "[I]n evaluating whether an
investigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and ordinary human
experience must govern over rigid criteria.' 1 86 Moreover, both probable
183. 515 U.S. 646, 652-54 (1995) (citations omitted).
184. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (citing
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989)).
185. Amar, supra note 2, at 780.
186. 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985).
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cause and reasonable suspicion inherently embody common sense,"' as
reiterated in Ornelas v. United States:
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable
cause" mean is not possible. They are common sense, non-
technical conceptions that deal with "the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men act." 188
The traditional legal thought behind these pronouncements implies
that common sense and reasonableness embody some transcendent,
universal knowledge, independent from and uninfluenced by the observer.
The assumption is that there is an ordinary experience shared by all humans
in everyday life. In contrast, feminist legal scholars and advocates for
women have long argued that women experience life differently than men
and differently from each other depending on race, class, and other
factors.1 89 In this sense, there is no ordinary human experience. Our
understandings of the world, common sense, and reason are inherently
intertwined with the identity of the observer. From this insight, feminists
went on to demonstrate how traditional constructions of reasonableness
represent particular life experiences of those socially enlisted with the
power to define reality on their own terms. Whatever makes sense to white
privileged men is imposed as common to all; whatever is reasonable from a
white privileged male perspective is deemed objectively reasonable,
excluding all other perspectives as subjective and unreasonable.
No less than reasonableness, common sense is an open-ended concept
which is receptive to multiple constructions despite its universal neutral
appeal. Like reasonableness, the objective, a-perspective stance of
common sense actually reflects the particular perspective of white
privileged men. This particular perspective sees itself as exclusive, and
dismisses as contrary to common sense any conclusions that are reached by
members of different races, genders, or classes in light of their lived-
experiences. Take for example the relevance of unprovoked flight from the
police to the formation of reasonable suspicion-a question that occupied
the Court in Illinois v. Wardlow.190 This case exemplifies both the inherent
subjectivity and positionality of common sense and the race and class
biases that taint the concept of reasonableness. It is a particularly potent
example because it demonstrates how our own experiences and identities
influence even our perceptions of supposedly objective external facts. The
influence of one's perspective is not only limited to subjective hunches or
187. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981).
188. 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)
(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949))).
189. See notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
190. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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interpretations like those made by experienced officers, but is inherent in
the construction of reality and knowledge.
In Wardlow, the Court held that an individual's unprovoked flight in a
high-crime neighborhood upon seeing the police may make police
suspicion "reasonable" and justify a stop and frisk.1 91 While headlong
flight is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, the Court found it
certainly suggestive of such as a matter of common sense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.192 For a white privileged judge, it may
be a matter of pure common sense that people do not run from the police
unless they have something to hide. Consequently, it would be reasonable
for the judge or the police to suspect a fleeing individual of wrongdoing
and to justify an investigative stop.
In contrast, for many individuals of color and the urban poor, the
dictate of common sense may justify entirely opposite results. In light of
their own experience or community experience with police harassment and
brutality, evading the police would not suffice to form a reasonable
suspicion, but would actually seem like a reasonable action regardless of
innocence or guilt. Such differing perceptions and common sense
inferences rising from the same external conduct exemplify how
reasonableness depends on one's race or class, for example, and how
common sense eventually means white and privileged sense.
The insight that race influences one's own understanding of what is
reasonable has gained a limited acceptance within traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. However, this limited acknowledgement of the
effect that being of a non-white race may have on reasonableness is not
accompanied by the further acknowledgement that reasonableness has
never been colorblind and has always been white. Implicitly, whiteness is
perpetuated as the norm, as the embodiment of neutrality and objectivity,
and as the essence of reasonableness.
Justice Stevens in Wardlow examined what common sense
conclusions could be drawn respecting the motives behind an unprovoked
flight from the police. 193 The State's argument was that unprovoked flight
is so aberrant and abnormal that it could not be explained by innocent
motives and was per se suspicious. In response, Justice Stevens noted:
Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those residing
in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the fleeing
person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification,
believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous, apart
from any criminal activity associated with the officer's sudden
presence. For such a person, unprovoked flight is neither
191. Id. at 124.
192. Id. at 125.
193. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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"aberrant" nor "abnormal." 94
Such alternative common sense inferences implicitly led Justice Stevens to
conclude that the unprovoked flight in this case was insufficient to form a
reasonable suspicion. 1
95
Akhil Amar ties race, gender, and class considerations directly to the
question of common sense and Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 196 For
Amar, the understanding of reasonableness as a matter of common sense
raises the question of who should decide what is unreasonable. 97 In his
view, Fourth Amendment issues should be decided by the jury, who
represent the common sense of common people.198 However, only a jury
that is truly inclusive along race, gender, and class lines can be said to be
representative of this common sense. 199
As a feminist, I welcome any attempts to expand our pool of
knowledge by taking race, gender, and class into consideration as a
necessary part of making sense of the world and the construction of
knowledge itself. The problem is that a fagade of external objectivity and
universal applicability is traditionally associated with these concepts of
common sense and reasonableness. What is missing from Stevens' and
Amar's race-conscious, gender-conscious, or class-conscious accounts is
the acknowledgement that reasonableness and common sense have always
been assigned a race (white), a gender (male), and a class (wealthy). In the
same way that male is the implicit reference for human, z °0 so is white the
universal race. We rarely think of white, wealthy men when we call for
taking race, gender, and class into consideration. The unstated norm
remains white, male, and privileged.
While reasonableness has always been thought of as gender-neutral or
genderless, feminists have begun to expose the maleness of reasonableness
in several contexts. For example, one critical insight of women's self-
defense work has been the idea that there is deep gender bias in the concept
of reasonableness.2 1 In general, men are viewed as inherently reasonable
194. Id. at 132-33.
195. Id. at 137.
196. Amar, supra note 2, at 780.
197. Id. at 818.
198. Id. at 780, 818-19 ("Threats to the 'security' of Americans come from both
government and thugs; the jury is perfectly placed to decide, in any given situation, whom it
fears more, the cops or the robbers. This judgment, of course, will vary from place to place
and over time.").
199. Id.
200. See MACKiNNON, supra note 5, at 168.
201. See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of
Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520 (1992)
[hereinafter Schneider, Particularity and Generality]; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing
and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on
Battering, 14 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 213 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Describing and
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and women are viewed as inherently unreasonable. Moreover, based on a
male paradigm of the brawl in the bar, self-defense traditionally requires an
imminent and life-threatening danger and usually imposes a duty to
202retreat. Therefore, women who stay in abusive relationships, plan the
killing, and surprise their abusers in their sleep would hardly seem to be
reasonably acting in self-defense (from the unstated male perspective).
Consequently, women become less likely to be able to plead self-defense
successfully and have been relegated to pleas of temporary insanity or
manslaughter. 203
The critical defense problem was and is used to explain the woman's
action as reasonable. It would seem that describing women's experiences
(to the extent that they differ from the experiences of men) and including
them within the legal discourse would result in women's conduct being
treated as reasonable. Thus, feminists called for viewing a woman's action
in the context of her experience as a battered woman and her inability to
204leave the relationship. Most judges and juries did not possess this
knowledge, which may have actually run counter to their common sense.
Hence, they had to be educated about the problems of male battering of
205
women and about the battered woman syndrome by expert witnesses.
Expert testimony on battering is important precisely because jurors'
common sense experience with domestic relationships gives them the
illusion of knowledge; jurors are not aware of how their views have been
shaped by common myths and stereotypes and tainted by bias. 20 6 It is
wrong to assume that the jurors can understand the possible reasonableness
of a battered woman's belief that she was in particular jeopardy at the time
that she responded in self-defense instead of leaving. The jury needs expert
testimony on reasonableness precisely because the jury may not understand
that the battered woman's prediction of the likely extent and imminence of
violence may be particularly acute, accurate, and reasonable.2 °7
Yet, maleness proved inherent in the concept of reasonableness itself.
Even with expert testimony, reasonableness and its male character resist
transformation. Although battered women's advocates intended
descriptions of battered women's experiences to illuminate and expand the
traditional concept of what reasonable means, the opposite effect often
resulted. The more specific and distinct the expert descriptions of these
experiences, the more it suggested a separate standard of a reasonable
Changing].
202. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 201, at 218-20.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 201, at 561-62.
206. Schneider, Describing and Changing, supra note 201, at 229-30.
207. Id.
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woman or a reasonable battered woman.2°s
Parallel outcomes have resulted in sexual harassment law, where some
courts have now adopted a 'reasonable woman' standard on the theory that
women's experiences with sexual harassment are so distinct that they
cannot apply a generic legal standard of reasonableness. 20 9 Opponents of
the 'reasonable woman' standard maintain that it substitutes the idea that
reasonableness is in the eye of the beholder for the notion of
reasonableness as an objective criterion; that it abandons all pretense of
judicial neutrality and plays favorites based on gender; and that it implies
that women are inherently unreasonable, for if women were objectively
reasonable there would be no need for a special subjective standard based
on a perspective understood only by women.21 °
But reasonableness already plays favorites based on gender; its
presumed objectivity and neutrality mask the vision of a particular male
beholder. The problem remains that such separate standards reinforce the
maleness of reasonableness and perpetuate the male experience and
viewpoint as the objective norm, while implying it is not a viewpoint at all.
All other perspectives are accommodated as a matter of policy. But they
can never become the objective norm; they can never define reasonableness
itself. They, in contrast to objective reasonableness, are always seen for
what they are: positional perspectives shaped by one's race, gender, class,
and overall life experiences.
III. Objectivity
Why is it that the gender, race, and class biases of reasonableness and
common sense standards evade detection and transformation? Why is the
concept of reasonableness inherently male? The answer lies in the aura of
objectivity that surrounds such legal standards. Thus, while traditional
critiques of the concept of reasonableness focus on its indeterminacy,
feminist critiques go a step further to expose reasonableness as a mirage.
Reasonableness "is an illusion that promises objectivity but actually
incorporates subjective beliefs." '' This illusion is so powerful that it is
difficult for lawyers and judges to challenge the paradigm of
reasonableness and the ideological underpinnings of objectivity overall.
208. Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 201, at 562-63.
209. Id. at 565. See also Raigrodski, supra note 17.
210. See, e.g., Paul B. Johnson, The Reasonable Woman in Sexual Harassment Law:
Progress or Illusion?, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 619, 634-39 (1993).
211. Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman
Standard in Theorv and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1435 (1992).
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A. Feminist Critique of Objectivity
Reasonableness is traditionally regarded as an objective standard
reflecting a neutral and communal agreement beyond the particular
subjective viewpoints of individuals. 212  Because of its appeal of
objectivity, reasonableness has gained a prominent position in almost every
area of American law, including search and seizure law.213 Conceptually,
reasonableness embodies societal consensus and community ideals that are
superimposed on individual behavior and constrain judicial decision-
making.214 The effectiveness of the reasonableness principle in achieving
objectivity therefore depends upon its fundamental neutrality215 and its
detachment from the subjective ideals of any individual. Feminists have
thus re-examined reasonableness as part of a critique of objectivity.216
Objectivity is a fundamental precept of Anglo-American
217jurisprudence. Patricia Williams observes how the opposition of
objectivity to subjectivity constructs our theoretical legal understanding.
Our legal thought and rhetoric are characterized by the existence of
"transcendent, a-contextual, universal legal truths" that are conveyed by
objective, unmediated voices such as judges. 218  "The more serious
problem of this essentialized world view is a worrisome tendency to
disparage anything that is nontranscendent (temporal, historical),
contextual (socially constructed), or non-universal (specific) as
'emotional,' 'literary,' 'personal,' or just Not True. 219 The result is, as
Letti Volpp points out, that our jurisprudence fails to recognize the inherent
subjectivity of legal standards and masks the oppressive force of the law
against subordinated communities.22o
Williams and Volpp are not alone in pointing out the subjectivity of
objectivity. As part of a persistent feminist investigation of the relationship
between power and knowledge, many feminist scholars have demonstrated
how particular views of the world dominate our discourse, "how our
212. L.A. County v. Rettele, 127 S.Ct. 1989, 1992 (per curiam) ("The test of
reasonablesness under the Fourth Amendment is an objective one.").
213. See generally Robert Unikel, "Reasonable" Doubts: A Critique of the Reasonable
Woman Standard in American Jurisprudence, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 326 (1992); see also
Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness
in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1181 (1990).
214. See generally Unikel, supra note 213; Ehrenreich, supra note 213.
215. Unikel, supra note 213, at 329.
216. Cahn, supra note 211, at 1406.
217. Unikel, supra note 213, at 326; see also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 8-9 (1991).
218. WILLIAMS, supra note 217, at 8.
219. Id.
220. Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifing Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense,"
17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 80 (1994).
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'knowledge' is far less diverse than our people."2 2' Central to these
critiques is skepticism about claims of objectivity and neutrality, and about
statements that purport to have universal applicability. The point is that
frequently what passes for the whole truth is instead a representation of
events from the perspective of those who possess the power to have their
version of reality accepted.222
Martha Minow, for example, has exposed the problematic nature of
knowledge when seen as an expression of the social and political positions
of those claiming to know. 223 She joins other feminists in arguing that the
unspoken assumption of objectivity masks the fact that knowledge depends
on the interaction between the one who sees and what is seen. Reality is
constructed from the unstated and biased standpoint of the observer,224 for
we cannot see the world unclouded by preconceptions. As Minow writes:
Seeing inevitably entails a form of subjectivity, an act of
imagination, a way of looking that is necessarily in part
determined by some private perspective. Its results are never
simple 'facts,' amenable to 'objective' judgments, but facts or
pictures that are dependent on the internal visions that generate
them.225
This argument is not uniquely feminist. Feminists, however, have also
exposed how our discourse of neutrality hinders any challenge to the actual
absence of objectivity, even if the impact of the observer's perspective is
oppressive.226 The observer's perspective is also oppressive because
knowledge is inextricably intertwined with social power. Thus, social
understandings based on prevailing views or consensus approaches express
the perspectives of those socially positioned to enforce their points of view
in society.227
The focus on the relation between knowledge and power allows
Minow to question the categorizing of people based on purportedly
objective and inevitable differences. She argues that the claim to
knowledge manifested by the labeling of any group as different "disguises
the act of power by which the namers simultaneously assign names and
221. Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J. OF WOMEN & L. 95, 95 (1992).
222. Id.
223. Martha Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally
Retarded, Equal Protection and Legal Treatment ofDifference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
111,174 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Differences].
224. Id. at 175-76.
225. Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986-Forward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REv. 10, 45-46 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered].
226. Id.
227. Minow, Differences, supra note 223, at 128.
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deny their relationships with, and power over, the named." 228  No
perspective asserted to produce "the truth" is objective, but rather will
obscure the power of the person attributing a difference while excluding
important competing perspectives. 229 This is because "[r]elationships of
power are often so unequal as to allow the namers to altogether ignore the
perspective of the less powerful., 230 Hence, the assignment of difference
marks the relationship between those who have the power to claim that
theirs is the true perspective and those who have no such power.23'
In sum, what initially seems an objective stance may appear partial
from another point of view. Moreover, what initially seems a fixed and
objective difference may seem from another viewpoint like the
subordination or exclusion of some by others. In any event, regardless of
which perspective ultimately seems persuasive, the possibility of multiple
viewpoints challenges the assumption of objectivity and "shows how
claims to knowledge bear the imprint of those making the claims., 232
Catherine MacKinnon also uses seemingly natural and real
differences-the differences between men and women based on sex-to
question objectivity. According to MacKinnon, objectivity assumes that
equally competent observers who are similarly situated see the same thing.
The line between subjective and objective perception that is supposed to
divide the idiosyncratic, partial, and unverifiable from the real, presumes
that only one reality exists, and that this reality is not contingent upon angle
of perception. But if sex-discriminatory conditions exist for women, there
are (at least) two realms of social meaning. Consequently, if women
inhabit a sex-discriminatory reality, their point of view is no more
subjective than men's. 233
The point of this observation is that "social circumstances, to which
gender is central, produce distinctive interests, hence perceptions, hence
meanings, hence definitions of rationality. 234 It follows that neutral legal
standards, as an expression of objectivity, are inadequate to describe the
non-neutral objectified social reality that women experience.235 Although
MacKinnon focuses on the role of gender in forming perceptions and
women's reality, her observations are applicable to race and class as well.
Moreover, the implication of her insight is not limited to the inadequacy of
gender-blind standards in addressing sex inequality. By analogy, neutral
objective reasonableness standards, like those dominating search and
228. Id.
229. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 225, at 33.
230. Minow, Differences, supra note 223, at 128.
231. Id. at 175.
232. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 225, at 14.
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seizure law, are inadequate to address police misconduct when multiple
realities shaped by gender, race, and class produce different understandings
of what is abusive or intrusive.
The core issue, however, is not the plain inadequacy of the stance of
objectivity to address socially constructed realities, but the oppressive
domination of male power that is objective epistemology. MacKinnon
writes: "[T]he male standpoint dominates society in the form of the
objective standard-that standpoint which, because it dominates in the
world, does not appear to function as a standpoint at all.
' 236
Objectivity as epistemology defines both the process of observation or
acquiring knowledge and the content of that knowledge and the world
observed. As the traditionally superior methodology for acquiring
knowledge, we have seen that the epistemology of objectivity erects
distance and a-perspectivity as its methodological criteria. To perceive
reality accurately, "one must be distant from what one is looking at and
view it from no place and at no time in particular, hence from all places and
times at once., 237 While the criteria of distance and a-perspectivity appear
to be general ways of getting at reality rather than constructing it, they have
specific social roots and implications. These include "devaluing as biased
and unreliable the view from the inside and within the moment, and the
perspective from the bottom of the social order.,
238
The objectivist epistemology controls not only the form of knowing
but also its content by defining how to proceed and the process of knowing,
and by confining what is worth knowing. Objectivity defines the relevant
world as that which can be objectively known. Hence, the epistemic
question concerns the relation between knowledge (a replication or
reflection of reality) and objective reality (that world which exists
independent of any knower or vantage point). This objective reality is
"independent of knowledge or the process of coming to know, and, in
principle, knowable in full." 23
9
In light of our current gendered social hierarchies, the world which
can be objectively known corresponds with men's reality. Since men
control the world, they create the world from their own point of view,
which then becomes the reality to be described. The male epistemological
stance-objectivity-does not comprehend its own perspective and does
not see that the way it apprehends its world is a form of its subjugation and
presupposes it. What is objectively known corresponds to the world as
men live it, and can thus be verified by being pointed to because the world
236. Id. at 237.
237. Id. at 97.
238. Id. at 99.
239. Id. at 97.
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itself is controlled from the same male point of view. 240
Because men control the world, the male epistemology of objectivity
dominates all our social structures, from science, to the state, to the law.
MacKinnon's critique of objectivity is bound up with her critique of the
state and of the law. According to MacKinnon, both the state and the law
are male in that objectivity is their norm.2 41 Objectivist epistemology is
expressly the law of law. The rule form, uniting scientific knowledge with
state control in its conception of what law is, institutionalizes the objective
stance as jurisprudence. 242  Consequently, since the imposition of the
stance of objectivity is the paradigm of power in the male form, then the
state and the law appear most relentless in imposing the male point of view
when it comes closest to achieving its criteria of distanced a-perspectivity.
When it is most ruthlessly neutral, it is most male.243 Accordingly,
reasonableness, as embodying neutral and objective point of viewlessness,
is thus particularly male and especially subordinating.
After exposing objectivity for its maleness, feminists exposed the
divide between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as other dichotomies,
as themselves being a product of male power. Because women have been
objectified as sexual beings and stigmatized as ruled by subjective
passions, they reject the division between subjective and objective postures.
"Disaffected from objectivity, having been its prey, but excluded from its
world through relegation to subjective inwardness, women's interest lies in
overthrowing the distinction itself,"244 argues MacKinnon. The goal is not
to affirm feminine particularity and reject masculine universality, nor to
reclaim female passion in place of male rationality. We should reject the
division of objectivity from subjectivity, of reason from emotion and of
abstract from concrete, as well as the discourse of opposites itself, because
they are invented from a position of power to maintain gender hierarchy.
We came to view the world generally as a series of complex dualisms,
such as reason-passion, rational-irrational, power-sensitivity, thought-
feeling, and objective-subjective. Men, who created our dominant
consciousness and discourse, have organized these dualisms into a system
in which each dualism has a strong positive side and a weak negative side.
Men associate themselves with the strong sides of the dualisms and project
the weak sides upon women.245 Socially, men are considered objective,
women subjective. Privileging reason over emotion or objectivity over
240. Id. at 121-22.
241. Id. at 162.
242. Id. at 162-63.
243. Id. at 248.
244. Id. at 120-21.
245. Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1575-76 (1983).
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subjectivity is traditionally male. The binary pairs, in turn, reflect the
hierarchy of gender in our society-the privileged status and control of
men over women.
246
These binary pairs came to be viewed as "natural" and "neutral;" mere
tools describing a pre-existing reality rather than having been constructed
by men to serve men's interests. Feminists exposed these dichotomies as
ideological social constructs driven by male power that are far from being
natural or inevitable. The distinction between the universal and the
particular was revealed to be false, because that which is called universal is
the particular from the point of view of male power. The subjective-
objective division was likewise revealed to be false because the objective
standpoint embodies the specific subjective view from the social position
of dominance that is occupied by men.247 Therefore, as long as men
continue to control women and male preferences continue to shape our
world and discourse, such dichotomies will continue to look "general,
empty of content, universally available to all, valid, mere tools, against
which all else fell short.,
248
B. Fourth Amendment Reasonableness and the Objective-Subjective Split
Accordingly, law will continue to value objectivity, reason, and
neutrality and marginalize particular perspectives as subjective,
unreasonable, and biased. This has clearly been the case in search and
seizure law. Within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the concept of
reasonableness has been particularly tied up with the objective-subjective
dichotomy. First, it is expressly embodied in the two prongs of the Katz
test.249 In addition, both the probable cause standard and the reasonable
suspicion standard embody objectivity in their resort to interpretation of the
facts from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable officer. 250 After all,
"the reasonable individual personifies a community ideal of reasonable
246. Id.
247. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
687, 690 (2000).
248. Id.
249. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
250. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) ("We have described
reasonable suspicion simply as 'a particularized and objective basis' for suspecting the
person stopped of criminal activity, and probable cause to search as existing where the
known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in
the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found. . . . The principal
components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable cause will be the events
which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.") (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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behavior., 251 The objective standpoint of a reasonable person/officer also
informs the definition of a seizure of a person, the evaluation of a third-
party apparent authority to consent to a search, and the application of the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. While not as explicit as in
the Katz test, the opposing notion of subjectivity plays a role in these
instances as well, both visible and invisible, both valued and devalued.
1. The Interplay of the Objective-Subjective Dichotomy in the Katz
Test
The gendered hierarchy of the objective-subjective dichotomy and the
resulting invalidation of subjectivity is manifest in the way each of the
prongs of the Katz test is articulated and applied as well as in the way the
two prongs relate to each other. The rhetoric and terminology of the
second prong of the Katz test perpetuate several of the dichotomies
questioned by feminists and reveal the connections between the privileged
male sides of these dichotomies, as well as between the weaker female
sides. In Katz itself, Justice Harlan's requirement that an expectation of
privacy be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable correlates
with the majority's holding that the government violated the privacy that
the defendant justifiably relied on. Subsequent cases applying the test
explained that the expectation must be objectively reasonable to be
legitimate.252 Both in the search context and in the standing context the
standard was restated so that reasonable is supplanted by legitimate,253 and
both terms are employed interchangeably.254  Hence: objective =
reasonable = legitimate = justified.
Like objectivity, notions of reasonableness, legitimacy, and
justification occupy the strong male sides of common dichotomies in our
legal and social discourse. Consequently, in a hidden and implicit manner,
subjective expectations of privacy are dismissed and devalued, as are the
weaker female sides of these dichotomies with which they are associated.
251. Unikel, supra note 213, at 329.
252. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
253. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment protects only those expectations of privacy that "society recognizes as
'legitimate"'); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (noting that only a person whose
own legitimate expectations of privacy have been violated may invoke the exclusionary
rule).
254. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 248 n.9 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Our decisions often use the words
,reasonable' and 'legitimate' interchangeably to describe a privacy interest entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 219-20, n.4 (1986)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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Hence: subjective = unreasonable = illegitimate = unjustified. Additional
hierarchical dichotomies are manifest in the construction of the subjective
prong as reflecting the actual and personal privacy expectations of the
individual as against the neutral, universal point of viewlessness of the
objective prong.
The manner in which the two prongs of the Katz test relate to each
other, normatively and as applied, further perpetuates the axiomatic
supposition about the objectivity of reasonableness and the
unreasonableness of subjectivity. Normatively, the first prong of the Katz
test supposedly reaffirms the value of individual subjectivity, by assigning
it a positive role in the determination of the scope of the constitutional
protection. However, it is doctrinally inferior to the second objective
prong. The test expresses a normative hierarchy between its two prongs, in
which the individual's subjective expectations of privacy are subjugated to
the objective expectations of privacy that are recognized by society. The
test is essentially an objective one: whether the expectation is one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.255 If the subjective
expectation deviates from that which the Court constructs as an objectively
reasonable perspective, then it is invalidated and undeserving of
constitutional protection.
The application of the two-pronged test further reinforces the
denigration and marginalization of personal (subjective) viewpoints. As it
turns out, personal subjective perceptions are essentially irrelevant to the
determination of a search. Sometimes the Court skips this part of the
analysis altogether, or assumes that there could not have been any
subjective expectation of privacy, regardless of whether the defendant
testified to the contrary or did not testify at all. For example, in Smith v.
Maryland,256 the Court doubted whether people in general entertain any
actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial, even though the
defendant testified that he manifested such expectation in his conduct.
257
In other cases, although the Court could have ended its inquiry based on the
absence of a subjective expectation of privacy, it chose to focus on the
objective prong, either in addition to or in place of the first prong. 258
255. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (citing Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-741
(1979).
256. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
257. Id. at 742 ("All telephone users realize that they must 'convey' phone numbers to
the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that
their calls are completed.").
258. See, e.g., United States v. Curry, 46 M.J. 733, 736 (1997) (noting briefly that the
defendant may have lacked a subjective expectation of privacy, being the one that placed the
telephone call to the police that accordingly went to the barracks to investigate a possible
murder, but grounding its holding on the absence of reasonable expectation of privacy in
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Finally, the stark contrast between the Court's treatment of an
individual's subjective expectation of privacy in an opaque soft bag placed
directly above his seat on the bus 259 and the Court's treatment of privacy
expectations in previous cases illustrates the skewed and unrealistic
construction of the subjectivity prong. 26° Bond, the plaintiff in the bus
case, could have better protected his privacy by traveling with a hard un-
squeezable suitcase; he could have better wrapped the drugs to conceal the
hard brick shape; and he could have placed his bag underneath his seat,
where it was less likely that other people would touch it. Thus, in his own
conduct, Bond did not manifest much of a subjective expectation of privacy
in his bag, at least not to the extent that is recognized by the Court.261 By
contrast, people who could not have done more to protect their privacy
when using the phone, 262 maintaining a bank account,2 63 disposing of
garbage,264 or traveling on public roads, 65 and even those who explicitly
tried to shield their privacy with high fences, "no trespassing" signs, and
266heavy curtains, were denied even the minimal recognition of their
subjective privacy expectations when the Court held in a series of cases
that they had affirmatively chosen exposure to public view. 267  The
message is that, objective reasonableness aside, even the subjective prong,
which pretends to draw from and validate actual individual's expectations,
is construed in the abstract to conform to the Court's vision of worthy
subjective expectations of privacy.
2. The Schizophrenic Treatment of Subjectivity: Empowering the
Police
The Court's treatment of subjectivity is inconsistent. Sometimes its
reasoning or holdings affirm and value subjectivity, and in other instances
they degrade and invalidate subjectivity. Rather than being a coincidental
inconsistency, this schism in the treatment of subjectivity is itself an
expression of male power and serves to perpetuate male domination.
Feminists like Frances Olsen have observed how in the same way that men
military barracks).
259. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336 (2000).
260. See generally, George M. Dery III, Lost Luggage: Searching for a Rule Regarding
Privacy Expectations in Bond v. United States, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 535 (2001).
261. Id. at 551-53.
262. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 742 (1979).
263. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441 (1976).
264. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
265. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983).
266. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207 (1986); Dery, supra note 260, at 551-55.
267. Id.
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simultaneously exalt and degrade women and the family, the Court
simultaneously exalts and degrades the concepts on the weak sides of
known dualisms. Irrational subjectivity and sensitivity, for example, are
both treasured and denigrated.268 Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes
apparent that men treasure subjectivity only to the extent that it is in their
interest and to the extent that their own subjectivity is affirmed. On the
other hand, men negate the role of subjectivity when it can disempower
them or empower others and undermine the domination of male power.
Instances in the Court's jurisprudence where subjectivity is
subordinated to so-called objectivity, as in the formulation and application
of the Katz test, are to be expected in light of the gendered hierarchy of the
objective-subjective dichotomy. 269 But this explanation is only part of the
story. We must closely scrutinize the instances where subjectivity is
valued in order to appreciate the oppressive impact of the objective-
subjective dichotomy. Accordingly, it is through the Court's schizophrenic
treatment of the subjectivity of police officers that we can fully understand
how male ideology informs the construction of both objectivity and
subjectivity, and how the particular subjectivities of those in power have
always factored into legal discourse.
When it comes to police officers, the split treatment of subjectivity is
clearly visible. On the one hand, "bad" subjective state of mind of the
police is deemed irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry, based on the
traditional rationale that personal subjective viewpoints have no place in an
otherwise objective jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Court explicitly
treasures the unique subjective experiences of police officers in fighting
crime and law enforcement, and otherwise gives weight to the officer's
"good" subjective state of mind in several contexts. The Terry Court even
explicitly positioned the two against each other when it stated that "in
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances,
due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and un-particularized
suspicion or hunch, but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is




Still, the affirmation of the officer's positive subjectivity is
accomplished either under the guise of objectivity itself or as a limited
exception to the rule of objectivity, warranted by special circumstances. At
the end, disregarding some aspects of police subjectivity and valuing other
aspects of it serves to reinforce the power of the police over the citizenry.
At the same time, maintaining objectivity as the norm the inherent
268. See Olsen, supra note 245, at 1575-76.
269. The individual's subjectivity is denigrated and invalidated, for example, through the
use of the reasonable person standard to determine whether a seizure has taken place. See
Raigrodski, supra note 17.
270. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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subjectivity of the legal discourse, hides the particular subjectivities that
currently shape the law, and hides the falsehood of the objective-subjective
divide. Overall, it perpetuates male power in its various forms, such as
state and police power.
a. Ignoring police officers' invidious subjective state of mind
Based on the traditional rationale that the law reflects objective
knowledge acquired through objective modes of inquiry, the Court
consistently holds that the reasonableness of the search or the seizure does
not depend on the subjective state of mind of the police officer. The Court
has long expressed a strong preference, in theory at least, for tying the
legality of law enforcement measures to objective circumstances rather
than to officers' intentions. 27 1 For example, the officer's invidious motive
is irrelevant in evaluating claims of use of excessive force to seize an
individual, 72 and the reasonableness of the force used must be judged from
the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.273 The Court even
stated that "the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action., 274 In addition, the
Court also notes the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent,
and reasons that the application of objective standards of conduct, rather
than standards that depend on the subjective state of mind of the officer,
best achieves evenhanded law enforcement.275
In Whren v. United States,276 the Court ruled that a police officer's
subjective intentions were irrelevant to the constitutional validity of a
traffic stop that is justified objectively by probable cause to believe that a
traffic violation has occurred.27 7  As a general matter, "subjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause Fourth Amendment
analysis. 278 The Court has since maintained its position that an action is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment regardless of the individual
officer's state of mind as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively,
271. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1990); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 656 n.6 (1984).
272. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
273. Id. at 396. See also Tennesse v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
274. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978).
275. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
276. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); aff'd Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33,
38 (1996); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S.
769 (2001); Brendlin v. California, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2408 (2007).
277. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810-13.
278. Id. at 813.
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justify the action, 279 despite widespread public recognition that many legal
traffic stops are initiated by the police as a pretext for drug and firearms
investigations.2 80
The Court is so adamant about not allowing bad subjectivity of police
officers to become a factor that it also declined to employ the reasonable
officer standard suggested by the petitioners. 28' Such standards are often
used to cloak particular subjectivities with the appearance of objectivity; a
reasonable person standard is a widely accepted legal fiction in search and
seizure law, tort law, criminal law, and most other legal areas. But in
Whren, the Court surprisingly blows the whistle on this fiction in a
remarkably ironic paragraph:
[T]his approach is plainly and indisputably driven by subjective
considerations. Its whole purpose is to prevent the police from
doing under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they
would like to do for different reasons. Petitioners proposed
standard may not use the word "pretext," but it is designed to
combat nothing other than the perceived "danger" of the
pretextual stop, albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases.
Instead of asking whether the individual officer had the proper
state of mind, the petitioners would have us ask, in effect,
whether (based on general police practices) it is plausible to
believe that the officer had the proper state of mind.
Why one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such
fashion that the court cannot take into account actual and
admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained by the
fact the our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option....
[E]ven if our concern had only been an evidentiary one,
petitioners' proposal would by no means assuage it. Indeed, it
seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an
279. See Robinette, 519 U.S. at 38; Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772 (per curiam); Devenpeck v.
Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 146-54 (2004) (rejecting a "closely related offense" rule and holding
that the officer's subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as
to which the known fact provides probable cause); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
404 (2006).
280. For a critique of Whren and its progeny, see, e.g., Ian D. Midgley, Just One
Question Before We Get to Ohio v. Robinette: "Are You Carrying Any Contraband . . .
Weapons, Drugs, Constitutional Protections.. . Anything Like That? ", 48 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 173 (1997); D. A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the
Fourth Amendment, SuP. CT. REv. 271 (1997).
281. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813-14 ("Recognizing that we have been unwilling to entertain
Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers,
petitioners disavow any intention to make the individual officer's subjective good faith the
touchstone of 'reasonableness.' They insist that the standard they have put forth-whether
the officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable
officer in the same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given--is an
'objective' one.").
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individual officer than to plumb the collective consciousness of
law enforcement in order to determine whether a "reasonable
officer" would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation.
• . . [O]rdinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the
hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical constable-an exercise
that might be called virtual subjectivity.282
Exercises in virtual subjectivity are nothing new in the Court's
jurisprudence. Even more so, framing a test in such a fashion that the
Court cannot consider actual pretext is not a curiosity but part of the male
ideology that controls our jurisprudence. So-called objective standards
embody and perpetuate the existing social order, and the Court's virtual
subjectivity conforms to the subjectivity of those in power while excluding
the subjectivity of others, all in the name of objectivity, judicial neutrality,
and the rule of law.
The Court's refusal to examine an officer's subjective state of mind is
not limited to probable cause analysis or to traffic stops. In Bond v. United
States, the Court treated the officer's subjective intent as irrelevant to the
question of whether the officer's conduct amounted to a search, i.e.
whether he violated a reasonable expectation of privacy in conducting a
tactile examination of Bond's carry-on luggage in the overhead
compartment of the bus.283 The Court applied Whren, reasoning that the
issue was not the officer's state of mind but the objective effect of his
actions. 284 The Court later re-emphasized in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond285 that subjective intent was irrelevant in Bond because the inquiry
286focuses on the objective effects of the actions of an individual officer.
Both Bond and Edmond demonstrate the Court's determination in
maintaining the fiction that individual subjectivity, here in its negative form
(bad intention or pretext), has no place in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. In both cases, the Court's reasoning rings particularly
hollow. In Bond, the Court not only distinguished the objective effects of
the officer's conduct from his subjective intention, but also distinguished
the conduct of the officer-squeezing the bag-from the same conduct by
fellow passengers on the grounds that the officer felt the bag in an
exploratory manner.287 As George Dery rightfully asserts, no matter how
the Court splits this hair, it is thinking about the officer's subjective intent
in touching the bag. The objective effect of the officer's hard squeeze was
the same as that risked by all travelers with carry-on luggage exposed daily
282. Id. at 814-15.
283. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
284. Id. at 338 n.2.
285. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
286. Id. at 46.
287. 529 U.S. at 339.
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to cramming, shoving, and pounding. The only difference between the
officer's squeeze and that of another stranger was the motive behind it. 288
The Court in Bond created two competing standards, concludes Dery.
An explicit standard, under Whren, rejects the need to divine an official's
subjective motivations; while an implicit standard, under Bond, enables
courts to consider subjective intent so long as it may be couched in terms of
objective manner. 289 For Dery, this double standard leads to confusion
among law enforcement in the field. 290 From a feminist perspective, these
are not merely conflicting signals, and their most important effect is not the
confusion it would create among law enforcers. This is how male ideology
and its epistemology of objectivity operate to devalue subjectivity, which
really means both dismissing and affirming subjectivity depending on who
is being empowered or subordinated by each option.
The Court continued to split hairs in order to dismiss police
subjectivity as irrelevant in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond291 when it
struck down the city's drug interdiction checkpoints. The Court
distinguished its holdings in Whren and in Bond from the case at issue, and
rejected the argument that if the government articulates a legitimate
purpose for the suspicionless checkpoints, then the courts should not look
into the actual (criminal investigation) purpose.292 The Court reasoned that
while subjective intentions are irrelevant, programmatic purposes are
relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions pursuant to a
suspicionless general scheme. 93 It concluded by emphasizing that the
purpose inquiry is to be conducted only at the programmatic level and is
not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the
scene. 294
This distinction between the programmatic level and the individual
level is as disingenuous as the distinctions drawn in Bond. It is hardly
believable that individual officers all across the nation are acting upon their
own aberrant initiatives to use traffic stops as a pretext for searching for
drugs or evidence of other crimes and are not implementing a
programmatic law enforcement purpose at some level, even absent official
drug interdiction checkpoints.
The Court also reasoned that an additional legitimate purpose, such as
verifying licenses and registrations, does not preclude an inquiry into the
real purpose of the program, because otherwise law enforcement authorities
288. Dery III, supra note 260, at 560.
289. Id. at 561.
290. Id.
291. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
292. Id. at 45.
293. Id. at 45-46.
294. Id. at 48.
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would be using license or sobriety checkpoints as a pretext for virtually any
purpose.295 But this is exactly the practice that the Court has sanctioned in
Whren and Robinette. I suspect that the Court implicitly employed its
programmatic versus individual distinction to accept in this case a pretext
argument it had previously rejected.
Finally, while the Court has often justified precluding an inquiry into
the subjective purpose or state of mind of the individual as impracticable if
not nearly impossible, in Edmond it stated that, "while we recognize the
challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry, courts routinely engage in this
enterprise in many areas of constitutional jurisprudence as a means of
sifting abusive governmental conduct from that which is lawful. 296 As a
result, "a program driven by an impermissible purpose may be proscribed
while a program impelled by licit purposes is permitted, even though the
challenged conduct may be outwardly similar.,
297
This is very true. Not only is an inquiry into motives possible, but it is
also essential if the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent abusive
governmental conduct. However, this is no less true when we are dealing
with the purpose of the individual police officer who is using a traffic stop
or a Terry stop as a pretext, racially motivated or not, than when we are
dealing with programmatic purposes. There is no justification for the
Court's caution that the purpose inquiry should be limited to the
programmatic level and not individual officers' motives. Of course,
distinguishing programmatic purposes from individual motives enables the
Court to maintain the pretense of objectivity and to empower the police in
the long-run. By invalidating the non-discretionary drug interdiction
checkpoints while at the same time leaving the Whren holding in place, the
Court made certain that police officers would continue, with even greater
zeal, to use discretionary traffic stops and Terry stops as a pretext to
criminal drug-related investigations, and the risk of governmental abuse of
power will only intensify.
Indeed, it did not take long for the Whren and Robinette potential for
governmental abuse to become a reality. In two later cases, the Court
disregarded the officers' motives in order to find arrests for minor traffic
violations reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, the Court did not find the arrest (including handcuffs and
booking procedures at the police station) for a seatbelt violation of Atwater,
a mother of small children, to be extraordinary or unusually harmful so as
to violate the Fourth Amendment. 298 The Court reasoned that the officer
295. Id. at 46.
296. Id. at 46-47.
297. Id. at 47.
298. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
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had objective probable cause 299 and disregarded the evidence that the
officer "had it in" for Atwater, seeming to have arrested her simply because
he had the power to do so. 3 0
Similarly, in Arkansas v. Sullivan, the Court approved of an arrest for
fine-only traffic violations (speeding, improper window tinting, and driving
without registration and insurance documentation), even though the stop
and the arrest were a pretext to conduct a full inventory search of the car in
light of "intelligence" the officer had on Sullivan regarding narcotics.3 °'
Citing Whren and Atwater, the Court held that any improper subjective
motivation of the police officer for the stop and the arrest did not render the
arrest (and subsequent search) unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.302
It remains to be seen what other practices may be approved of by the
Court with further holdings hiding behind its rhetoric that an officer's
individual subjectivity plays no role in the reasonableness inquiry. The
consequences are already clear: the power that the police can exert over an
individual, and the real potential for abuse that comes with any such power,
is tremendous. Rather than protecting the individual from governmental
abuse, the Court enables such abuse to proceed with impunity and
magnifies the subordination of the citizenry to state power.
b. Empowering police officers by ignoring invidious
subjectivity: the remedial context
The empowering effect of ignoring the officer's bad subjectivity is
augmented if we consider the two common remedies for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures: excluding the evidence in the criminal context and imposing
299. Id. at 353-54.
300. The opinion recites the following facts: As he approached the truck, officer Turek
yelled "we've met before" and "you're going to jail," and called for backup. Atwater failed
to provide the officer with her papers, saying her purse was stolen the day before, to which
the officer replied that he had "heard that story two hundred times." Atwater asked to take
her frightened, upset, and crying children to a friend's house nearby, but the officer told her
"you're not going anywhere" and apparently threatened to take the children into custody as
well. After Atwater's friend, who learned from the neighborhood children what was going
on, arrived and took the children away, the officer handcuffed Atwater, placed her in his
squad car, and drove her to the local police station, where booking officers had her remove
her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and empty her pockets. Her mug shot was taken, and
she was placed, alone, in a jail cell for about an hour, after which she was taken before a
magistrate and released on $3 10 bond. Atwater ultimately pled no contest to misdemeanor
seatbelt offenses, paid a $50 fine, and sued for violation of her Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable seizure. Id. at 323-24.
301. Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 770.
302. Id. at 771.
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personal civil damages liability on the officer. The exclusionary rule has
been recognized since its inception as a principal mode of discouraging
lawless police conduct.30 3 It is a "judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect. 30 4 The Court has often said that it is the only effective deterrent to
police misconduct in the criminal context, and that without it the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would
be a mere "form of words. 305  Another, less important goal of the
exclusionary rule is to protect judicial integrity. 306 Hence, the courts "will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such
invasions. 3 °7
The rule does more than deter future misconduct by individual officers
who have the evidence suppressed in their own cases. Its chief deterrent
function operates by promoting general institutional compliance with the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement agencies. 308 It
demonstrates the serious consequences our society attaches to a violation of
constitutional rights, and is thus thought to encourage, over the long term,
those who formulate law enforcement policies and the officers
implementing them to incorporate Fourth Amendment ideals into their
value system.3 °9 On the other hand, as the Court itself acknowledges,
"admitting evidence in a criminal trial has the necessary effect of
legitimizing the conduct which produced the evidence. 310
Rather than broadening the opportunities to deter police misconduct
and encouraging the police to value Fourth Amendment ideals, the
irrelevancy of the officer's bad faith to Fourth Amendment analysis
affirmatively prevents the fulfillment of these goals, even in those instances
where there is no mistake about the police intention to subvert the
commands of the Fourth Amendment. One would think lawless conduct,
such as in United States v. Payner,311 where the IRS agent deliberately
broke into an apartment and stole confidential documents, is exactly the
kind of governmental misconduct that the Fourth Amendment was
designed to combat and that the exclusionary rule would help deter.
Likewise, in order to attempt to eradicate racial animus by the police, it is
303. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914).
304. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
305. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
306. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
307. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
308. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 953 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
309. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 (1976).
310. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13.
311. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
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necessary to apply the exclusionary rule at least in those cases where such
animus is not in dispute. Hence, subjective (bad) intentions are very
relevant to deterring abusive conduct and to maintaining the integrity of the
courts. By ignoring any such bad faith motives and admitting the evidence
obtained by the misconduct, the Court legitimizes governmental abuse and
intentional subversion of constitutional guarantees. It therefore empowers
the police to continue to exert subordinating power over the individual.
Even when the exclusionary rule is applicable, its appropriateness and
effectiveness are a matter of controversy. In some contexts, the
exclusionary rule cannot provide redress to the individual whose rights are
infringed. The Court itself has stated that the exclusionary rule is
powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the
police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal. 312 Hence,
for example, the wholesale harassment that minority groups frequently
complain of by certain elements of the police community will not be
stopped by the exclusion of evidence from any criminal trial.313
Indeed, when government officials abuse their offices, "action[s] for
damages may offer the only realistic avenue for vindication of
constitutional guarantees. '3 14  The individual can thus pursue the
imposition of personal civil liability against the officer for violating his
Fourth Amendment rights by filing either a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit if state
officers are involved,315 or making a Bivens claim against federal
officers.3 16 In both instances, however, the doctrine of qualified immunity
may shield the officer from personal civil liability for damages if the police
conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.317
Whether an officer protected by qualified immunity may be held
personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action turns on the objective
legal reasonableness of the action. 3 18 The officer's subjective beliefs or
invidious motives are irrelevant to that inquiry, and consequently irrelevant
to the determination of the qualified immunity defense.319 In cases such as
Atwater, or when the police use traffic violations as pretext to harass
minorities, the failure to examine the officer's bad subjectivity will allow
qualified immunity to apply since objective probable cause exists. As a
312. Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15.
313. Id.
314. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
315. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
316. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1972).
317. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987); Malley
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
318. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
319. Id. at 815-20; Creighton, 483 U.S. at 641.
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result, the officer will be shielded from liability even though these are the
most appropriate cases to impose liability for the clear abuse of official
power. Having no remedy against the abuse, the individual is violated and
subordinated again. In contrast, having his or her conduct legitimated, the
officer is empowered to continue the abuse of power with impunity.
c. Validating police officers 'personal experiences under the
guise of objectivity
While the Court is persistent in ignoring negative subjectivity on the
part of the officer at the substantive and remedial stages of Fourth
Amendment adjudication, positive subjectivity of the officer often plays an
important role in the Court's jurisprudence. Such subjectivity is not treated
as valuable on its own terms but is rather validated under the guise of
universal objectivity and reasonableness.
The glimpses into the officer's positive subjective state of mind are
typically of two kinds. First, the Court permits reliance on the officer's
unique experience and knowledge in the overall reasonableness analysis
and in the formation of probable cause and reasonable suspicion. Second,
the Court assigns legal relevancy to the officer's good faith beliefs during
the execution of searches and seizures. The officer's good faith
subjectivity is relevant to substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine, such as
to the formulation of a third party's apparent authority to consent to a
search. The officer's good faith subjectivity is also relevant to remedial
aspects like the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.
In the first kind of endorsed subjectivity, the Court not only defers to
the officer's experiences, knowledge, and skills in dealing with criminal
suspects,320 but affirmatively approves of the use of such personal expertise
as a matter of law.32' Personal observations of the police officer and the
inferences he or she thereafter draws based on personal experience, special
320. See, e.g., Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (since "a police officer
views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise," the inferences he
draws deserve deference).
321. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884-85 ("[T]he officer is
entitled to assess the facts in light of his experience."); United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 566 (1980) ("[I]n applying the test of 'reasonableness,' courts need not ignore the
considerable expertise that law enforcement officials have gained from their special training
and experience."); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (holding that law
enforcement officer can rely on his own experience in detection and prevention of crime);
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002) (recognizing that officers are allowed to
draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and
deductions about the cumulative information available to them).
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training, and expertise may establish probable cause 322 and are typically the
primary bases for reasonable suspicion.323 Moreover, the Court affords
considerable deference to the observations and inferences of the police
even regarding facially innocent details, reasoning that an experienced
officer can infer criminal activity from conduct that seems innocuous to a
324lay observer. For example, the central role of the officer's personal
policing experience in the formulation of reasonable suspicion was evident
in United States v. Sharpe, where the Court stated:
Perhaps none of these facts, standing alone, would give rise to a
reasonable suspicion; but taken together as appraised by an
experienced law enforcement officer, they provided clear
justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited
investigation.325
I certainly think that police officers do and should be allowed to
perceive the facts in light of their unique experiences. My deep
disagreement with the Court lies elsewhere. First, the Court limits its
affirmation of personal experiences to police experience in law
enforcement. This has two effects. First, while valuing the officers'
experiences validates and empowers the police as actors in search and
seizure activities and as human beings, the exclusion of all other subjective
experiences serves to invalidate and undermine the humanity of others, as
well as to severely limit the protections afforded by the Fourth
Amendment. This is evident in the Court's expectations of privacy cases,
and its characterization of the reasonable person standard.326 Furthermore,
the Court still maintains the fiction that, in general, facts can be objectively
described from a neutral stance, rather than acknowledging that our
experiences and identities always shape the way we perceive the world.
This stance of objectivity serves to legitimize the status quo and to
322. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) (finding that a police
officer may draw inferences based on his own experience in deciding whether probable
cause exists).
323. See, e.g., Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 266 (the officer's assessment of the situation in light of
his specialized training as a border patrol agent and his familiarity with the customs of area
inhabitants was sufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling and justify
stopping the suspect vehicle).
324. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742-43 (1983) (probable cause to arrest
when experienced police officer, who knew narcotics frequently transported in party
balloons, inferred that a party balloon observed in plain view contained narcotics); Ornelas,
517 U.S. at 700 (holding that a veteran officer, who had searched roughly 2000 cars, could
see loose car panel as evidence of hidden drugs); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418
(1981) (officers with special border patrol training and experience had reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity upon observing distinctive shoeprints on an isolated area of the road, a
high occupancy vehicle, and late night travel close to border).
325. 470 U.S. 675, 682 n.3 (1985).
326. See Raigrodski, supra note 17.
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perpetuate the dominance of particular views from a position of power as
the true representation of reality, while other constructions of reality are
dismissed as untrue and undeserving of legal and social recognition.
Second, while the uniqueness of the individual officer's personal
policing experiences and knowledge is the basis that justifies the officer
relying on them to assess the facts and to construe reality, the Court's
rhetoric never refers to these experiences for what they really are:
inherently personal and subjective. In this manner, the Court is able to
maintain the epistemology of objectivity and to exclude as subjective and
personal the experiences it is not interested in validating. This objectivist
rhetoric represents the general ideology and epistemology of objectivity
that, feminists argue, is particularly entrenched with gender hierarchy. This
broader ideological and epistemological subordination of subjectivity
perpetuates the subordination of that which is considered female and
strengthens the social control of men over women.
The stronghold of the ideology and epistemology of objectivity is
clear in those instances where the Court assigns legal relevancy to the
officer's good faith beliefs during the execution of searches and seizures.
The Court's treatment of a police officer's subjectively honest yet mistaken
beliefs in executing searches and seizures suitably demonstrates that the
law actually incorporates particular subjective experiences without
deviating from its rhetoric of objectivity. The doctrine of a third party's
apparent authority to consent to a search and the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule further exemplify how the officer's subjective good faith
belief is indeed legally relevant but only, at least in theory, if it measures
up against an objective reasonableness standard.
In the context of the officer's good faith conduct, mistaken or not, the
officer's state of mind is most relevant to the evaluation of the
reasonableness of his conduct, in a way that can and often does result in the
validation of what otherwise might be characterized as an unreasonable
search or seizure. Thus, in upholding a warrantless search incident to an
arrest of the wrong person, the Court said:
[T]he officers in good faith believed Miller was Hill and arrested
him. They were quite wrong.., and subjective good-faith belief
would not in itself justify either the arrest or the subsequent
search. But sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone
of reasonableness . . . the officers' mistake was understandable
and the arrest a reasonable response to the situation facing
them.... 327
Similarly, the Court held that room must be allowed for some
mistakes on the part of officers, but only those mistakes that reasonable
327. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1971).
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men might have made.328 Hence, the officers' good faith subjective
mistakes must first be incarnated as objectively reasonable. Not
surprisingly, however, they often are.
329
Evaluating the officer's mistaken conduct against an objective
reasonable person standard is explicitly the crux of the Court's analysis of
searches based on a third party's apparent authority to consent to a search.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court expanded the doctrine of searches based
on third party's consent to include the latter's apparent authority to give
consent if the officers reasonably (though erroneously) believe that the
third party had authority to consent.330 The Court explained that its holding
does not suggest that the officers may always accept the third party's
assertion of authority. The surrounding circumstances could be such that a
reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without further
inquiry. 331  Hence, the consent must "'be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment . ..
"warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the consenting
party had authority over the premises. 332  If not, a warrantless entry
without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if
so, the search is valid.333
Combined with the Court's blindness to the bad faith of police
officers, this last mentioned subjective-objective analytical structure may
lead to interesting results. Assume that an officer subjectively acts in bad
faith and enters the premises even though she does not believe authority to
consent exists (thus, acting in blatant disregard of any privacy interests
protected under the Fourth Amendment). If the third party does have actual
authority to consent, the entry will be validated and the officer's conduct
will be deemed reasonable, even though she abused her power.
Consequently, any evidence obtained would be admissible despite the
specific need to deter such police conduct. In contrast, if the officer
subjectively believes in good faith that authority to consent exists but the
Court finds that an objective but hypothetical reasonable person would not
so believe, the officer's conduct would be deemed unreasonable and
unjustifiable, although no governmental abuse of power took place. Any
evidence obtained would be excluded, even if doing so does not seem to
advance any goal of deterrence or judicial integrity.
What happens if the officer subjectively acts in bad faith, when no
328. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
329. See also Raigrodski, supra note 17 (comparing the construction of the reasonable
officer standard in favor of officers in general with the typical construction of the reasonable
person standard to the disadvantage of the individual).
330. 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
331. Id. at 188.
332. Id. at 188-89 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)).
333. Id. at 189.
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actual authority to consent exists, but the Court finds that an objectively
reasonable person would have believed such authority existed?
Supposedly, good faith on behalf of the officer is a necessary first step in
the apparent authority analysis. But if the Court's treatment of the
subjective and objective prongs of the Katz expectations of privacy test is
any indication, the subjective element will likely be left behind. Therefore,
it is likely in such a case that the officer will again be rewarded (his or her
conduct deemed reasonable and constitutional, and the evidence
admissible) despite the abuse of power and intentional disregard for the
individual's constitutional civil rights.
Finally, the remedial aspects of the Fourth Amendment also
demonstrate how the Court's schizophrenic approach to the police officer's
subjectivity actively operates to enlarge the power and control of the police
over the individual, and with it the potential for abuse, within the
traditional boundaries of a fictional and oppressive discourse of objectivity.
As we have seen, the officer's subjective bad faith state of mind will not
factor into the question of whether evidentiary exclusion is warranted,
regardless of any deterrence goals. On the other hand, his subjective good
faith state of mind is, as the name indicates, relevant to the application of
the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, particularly in light of the
deterrence purposes of this remedy. Subjectivity comes in through the back
door of an ostensibly objective reasonableness standard.
An officer's subjective state of mind is often deemed relevant by the
Court. In United States v. Leon,334 the Court held that the exclusionary rule
will not apply to evidence obtained by an officer whose (subjective good
faith) reliance on a search warrant was objectively reasonable, even though
the warrant was found to be defective. 33 This good faith exception would
not apply where the warrant was so facially deficient that the officer
"cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. '336 In Illinois v. Krull, the Court
applied the good faith exception to circumstances where the officers acted
in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless
administrative searches, which was ultimately found to violate the Fourth
Amendment. 337 As in Leon, the officer cannot be said to have acted in
good faith reliance upon a statute if its provisions are such that a reasonable
officer should have known that the statute was unconstitutional. 338
In both cases, the Court insisted that the standard of reasonableness it
had adopted was an objective one and did not turn on the subjective good
334. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
335. Id. at 926; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
336. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
337. 480 U.S. 340, 349 (1987).
338. Id. at 355.
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faith of individual officers. 339 But it did not explain what would make the
officer's good faith reliance on a warrant or on a statute objectively
reasonable. In light of the overall deference and credibility that the Court
affords police officers, I suspect that in most cases the Court will validate
the officer's subjective beliefs as reasonable in the same way that it usually
finds that the officer's suspicion is an objectively reasonable one.
Validating actual experiences and perceptions of individual officers seems
justified in itself for a feminist advocating a concrete experience-based
knowledge. Nothing, however, makes these perceptions more reasonable
or more objective than any other perspectives deemed unreasonable.
IV. Discarding the Pretense of Reasonableness and Objectivity
As a feminist, my concern is not with the affirmation itself of the
actual personal experiences and perceptions of individual officers. Law
would be more just if the actual experiences and viewpoints of us all,
especially of those of us who have traditionally been silenced and excluded
from the legal discourse, were to shape our jurisprudence, inside and
outside of the Fourth Amendment. For that to happen, however, the law
must accept the actual perspectives of all as equally valuable rather than
upholding or degrading particular perspectives in a manner that
consistently empowers the government and subordinates the individual,
especially those who are already socially oppressed.
Is it possible for feminist or other outsider constructions of reality to
attain the status of objectivity within a legal framework that recognizes
multiple realities? Martha Chamallas thinks the answer depends on
whether objectivity will come to mean a construction of reality deserving
legal recognition and protection rather than a neutral assessment devoid of
perspective.34 ° I propose that we take a step further towards transforming
our discourse and jurisprudence. Rather than trying to attain the status of
objectivity within a discourse based on the division of objectivity from
subjectivity, we can strive to discard the male epistemology of objectivity
and the dichotomies it entails. We need to "discard the habit of equating
our most noble aspirations with objectivity and neutrality" 341 and adopt a
concrete experience-based multi-perspectival epistemology and
methodology. This alternative epistemology is not to be mistaken for
replacing male objectivity with female subjectivity. The point is not that
subjectivity is superior to objectivity or that passion is superior to reason.
Rather, it is only through the wholesale rejection of the polarization of the
339. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20; Krull, 480 U.S. at 355.
340. Chamallas, supra note 221, at 123.
341. Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
1373, 1402 (1986).
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dualistic pairs that we can create "the possibility of wholeness."' 342
Within that newly envisioned feminist jurisprudence, should we also
discard the concept of reasonableness or should we retain and redefine it?
Like objectivity, the concept of reasonableness carries with it an immense
symbolic power that can legitimate outsider claims. On the other hand, like
objectivity, the risk is that even when used by the disempowered,
reasonableness will continue to hide power hierarchies and thereby
legitimate fundamentally oppressive structures. Especially if the new
formulations of reasonableness are presented as neutral themselves, the
redefined construct will merely reinforce and legitimate an unequal status
quo. 343  The failure, so far, of battered women's self-defense work in
transforming the concept of reasonableness, and the emergence of gender-
and race-specific reasonableness sub-standards, demonstrate how grave
that risk is. It also seems futile and even harmful to attempt a
transformation of the concept of reasonableness when it is so closely tied to
the idea of objectivity and cannot allow for such a transformation.3 44
Within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in particular, reasonableness
and objectivity have proven unable to address the core problems of citizen-
government relations in a meaningful and just manner. Neither the
overarching umbrella of reasonableness nor any specific reasonableness-
based standards account for the power hierarchy that exists between the
government, particularly the police, and the citizenry. Nor can any
reasonableness standard meaningfully constrain oppressive power or
address the harms of subordination. To the contrary, the notions of
reasonableness and objectivity perpetuate such oppressive hierarchies.
Therefore, it is especially important to displace the notion of
reasonableness and the ideology of objectivity within search and seizure
law.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should instead be restructured to
account for government power and its abuse as means of controlling and
subordinating the citizenry. Such a constitutional regime that is concerned
with power and with hierarchical relations of domination will examine the
behavior of the police officer and of the individual in light of the power
hierarchies between them. This paradigmatic shift requires abandoning
reasonableness-based standards altogether. 4  Instead, I suggest we
342. Olsen, supra note 245, at 1575-76.
343. See Ehrenreich, supra note 217, at 1231.
344. Id. at 1232.
345. Cf Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in
Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII: Who is the Reasonable Person?, 38
B.C. L. REV. 861, 885 (1997) ("Power is the root of sexual harassment .... The
,reasonableness' standards do not account for the unique power relationship that often exists
between a landlord and a tenant. . . . [T]he law should focus on relations between the
oppressor and the oppressed and question the defendant's actions in light of the power
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embrace the values of anti-subordination and empowerment to guide us in
resolving power struggles within the context of the Fourth Amendment.
Refocusing the Fourth Amendment on oppressive power and
subordination will require a new legal discourse, one explicitly committed
to seeking out multiple perspectives other than our own instead of
perpetuating an ideology of false objectivity and elitist reasonableness.
This transformation is called for by the substantive core of the Fourth
Amendment, by the general feminist critique of objectivity, by the
commitment of feminists to voice the experiences of the oppressed other,
and by the need to build on these experiences as a source of unique
knowledge in the struggle against our subordination.
A commitment to anti-subordination and empowerment requires us to
abandon the pretense of abstract objectivity and universal knowledge and
adopt a multi-perspectival way of knowing informed by the detailed
particularities of our lives. These particularities then "become facets of the
collective understanding within which differences constitute rather than
undermine collectivity. 346 As Ann Scales observes, if the purpose of law
is indeed to decide the moral crux of the matter in real human situations,
"[I]t would seem obvious that law's duty is to enhance, rather than to
ignore, the rich diversity of life. Yet this purpose is not obvious; it is
obscured by the myth of objectivity which opens up law's destructive
potential.,
347
The myth of objectivity exemplifies the way in which knowledge-
itself an embodiment of power-has been used as a mechanism of
exclusion and marginalization of those who do not possess the power to
have their version of reality accepted. The abstract universality of the
objective point of viewlessness in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence treats
the particular perspectives of the powerful as reality and defines other
perspectives out of existence. In contrast, aware of the inextricable
connection between knowledge and power, feminists practice a positive,
inclusive, and empowering vision of knowledge that does not require
objectifying some other.
Feminist epistemology values the multiplicity of perspectives and
realities. It takes multiplicity to be constitutive of reality; it sees different
perspectives as systematically related to each other and to other relations,
such as exploited and exploiter; and it regards different perspectives as
emergent and always changing.348 Feminist legal scholars have developed
several versions of such multi-perspectival jurisprudence, but one message,
differentials between the parties. This shift in focus requires abandoning the reasonableness
standards altogether.").
346. MACKiNNON, supra note 5, at 86.
347. Scales, supra note 348, at 1387-88.
348. Id. at 1388.
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captured by Martha Minow, unites them: "Only through the variety of
relationships constructed by many people seeing from different
perspectives can truth be known and community be created. 349
Judges, lawyers, and police officers must rethink how we come to
know what we know. Particularly within the context of the Fourth
Amendment, we must contemplate how and what we know about harm and
injurious behavior. We must be more attentive to the lives of other people
and the forces they operate within. Moreover, we must learn to view the
world from more than a single, reflexive position. Patricia Williams has
described this practice as the "ambi-valent, multivalent way of seeing that
is. .. at the heart of what is called critical theory, feminist theory, and the
so-called minority critique. 35 ° It is the "fluid positioning that sees back
and forth across boundary, ' 35' and which has been the "daily experience of
people of color and of women. 352
Others advocate multiple consciousness as a jurisprudential method
that ties together consciousness-shifting with a search for the pathway to a
just world. In consciousness-shifting, Mari Matsuda refers to the ability to
see that the law reflects a particular viewpoint, to operate within that view,
and at the same time to shift out of it for purposes of critique, analysis, and
strategy.353 Such multiple consciousness is not a mere random ability to see
all points of view, but a deliberate choice to see the world from the
standpoint of the oppressed. We can all choose to know the concrete lived
details of others by reading, studying, and listening. The jurisprudence of
outsiders teaches us that these details and the emotions they evoke are
important as we set out on the road to justice. 35
For some, like Martha Minow, acknowledging our own inability to
escape our perspective and seeking out multiple viewpoints is specifically
the path to justice. As Martha Minow declares:
Justice is engendered when judges admit the limitations of their
own viewpoints, when judges reach beyond those limits by trying
to see from contrasting perspectives, and when people seek to
exercise power to nurture differences .... As we make audible, in
official arenas, the struggles over which version of reality will
secure power, we disrupt the silence of one perspective, imposed
349. Martha Minow, Stories in Law, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN
THE LAW 24, 34 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz, eds., 1996).
350. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay of Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128, 2151 (1989).
351. Id.
352. Patricia Williams, Response to Mari Matsuda, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 11 (1989).
353. Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as
Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
354. Id.
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as if universal.355
Minow thus calls on judges to identify vantage points, to learn how to
adopt contrasting vantage points, and to decide which vantage points to
embrace in given circumstances.356 She urges the judiciary to make a
perpetual commitment to seek out unstated assumptions and typically
unheard points of view. 357 Rather than rules and fixed standards, we need
struggles over descriptions of reality. Law should be "an opportunity to
endow rival vantage points with the reality that power enables, to
redescribe and remake the meanings of the world that has treated only
some vantage points as legitimate. 358
It is especially important that judges engage in an analysis that is self-
consciously aware both of their own perspectives and of the concrete
circumstances and varying viewpoints involved in any Fourth Amendment
issue. While no judge will be able to completely escape his or her own
cultural blinders, an ongoing effort to occupy the place of the other can
push us to challenge our ignorance and fears and to investigate our usual
categories for making sense of the world.359 Minow explains:
Once you try to break out of unstated assumptions and take the
perspective of the "other" you may glimpse that your patterns for
organizing the world are both arbitrary and foreclose their own
reconsideration. You may see an injury that you had not noticed,
or take more seriously a harm that you had otherwise discounted.
You will get the chance to examine the reference point you
usually take for granted. Maybe you will conclude that the
reference point itself should change .... You may find you had
so much ignored the point of view of others that you did not
realize you were mistaking your point of view for reality.
Perhaps you will find that the way things are is not the only way
things could be.36°
It is not easy to understand those whose experiences and values are
very different from our own. It takes practice, emotional maturity, and
humility to make a habit of looking through the perspectives of others,
advocates Minow. It takes an even greater effort to be moved by them. We
need to open our minds to the possibility that a reality other than our own
may matter.361 Indeed, the very effort to imagine another perspective could
sensitize us to the possibility of a variety of perspectives, and could allow
355. Minow, supra note 229, at 95.
356. Id. at 14-15.
357. Id. at 16.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 79-80.
360. Id. at 72.
361. Id. at 74.
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us to open our minds to accept more than one, two, or even three truths in
any given situation.
362
Proceeding with humility and educating ourselves to take the
perspective of the other will broaden anyone's perspective. For judges,
lawyers, and police officers, such practice is crucial. Not only will it better
protect individuals from governmental abuse, but it will also make us better
judges, lawyers, and police officers. An officer sensitive to the perspective
of a person of color who lives in a neighborhood in which expectations of
police brutality are routine may choose not to regard seemingly evasive
conduct as suspicious. Consequently, the officer may decide not to force
an encounter upon an individual or at least not to resort to forceful means
of detention. Similarly, officers and judges may not be so quick to construe
an individual's submissive behavior as consent to a search. They may
better appreciate the forces that lead an individual to perceive no other
choice than to comply, and consequently may decide not to exploit this
weakness.
When we take other perspectives into account it does not necessarily
mean that the perspective of the other will or should prevail. But at least it
will be seriously considered. In the long-term, the working premises of
police officers and judges may even be transformed so as to better weigh
the interests of the individual. Furthermore, if fewer subordinating
altercations between individuals and the police occur, or if more instances
of oppressive governmental conduct are redressed by the courts, we will
have fulfilled the promise of the Fourth Amendment and restored faith in
the criminal justice system.
To aid judges, lawyers, police officers, and the public in familiarizing
ourselves with the perspectives of others, I suggest that we explicitly adopt
a methodology of narratives. We should incorporate first person narratives
into judicial opinions, police training, and media coverage of Fourth
Amendment issues. Up until now, attempts to "imagine" other
perspectives within traditional doctrinal structures like a reasonable person
or officer standard have resulted in a narrow, one-dimensional, elitist, and
oppressive perspective. In contrast, we should make room for concrete
personal accounts of the parties involved. To some extent, personal
accounts of police officers are already included in the law, as exemplified
by the Court's deference to officers' accounts in forming reasonable
suspicion and probable cause. But even an officer's voice is often filtered
through the hypothetical lenses of the reasonable officer, and her first
person testimony is relegated to a footnote rather than being a focal point of
the Court's opinion.
The story form is itself well suited to portray the multiplicity of
362. Minow, supra note 227.
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363human viewpoints about any given event. Its inevitable particularity
may provide a way for us to understand the diversity of perceptions that are
attributable to race, class, gender, or other individual factors. 364  The
narrative methodology is attentive to the partiality of any story; in fact, it
revels in particularity, difference, and resistance to generalization. Thus, it
has immense potential for enacting and expressing insights about the
partiality of any individual's viewpoint, as well as for providing us with the
hope that we can come to imagine the viewpoint and experiences of
others. 365  First person stories, particularly those about police-citizen
encounters, may allow judges, police officers, and the public to connect
and allow ourselves to be persuaded by stories that previously seemed
unbelievable because of their unfamiliar otherness.
366
363. Minow, supra note 357.
364. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv.
761, 798-99 (1990).
365. Minow, supra note 357, at 34-35.
366. Several law professors have already started using these sorts of narratives in their
law school courses. Their experiences may give us a better understanding of the possibility
of acquiring knowledge of the point of view of others and of the real potential of
incorporating first person narratives into legal discourse. Joseph Singer, for example, used
narrative to help students recognize aspects of themselves of which they previously were
unaware. Joseph W. Singer, Legal Storytelling: Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2442 (1989).
Singer's property students were having a hard time understanding workers'
arguments in plant closing cases. He thus created a story that required them to hypothesize
that the law school had decided that it could raise its bar passage rates by flunking out one-
third of the students. Id. at 2449. According to Singer, "the story encouraged students to see
the world from someone else's perspective." Id. at 2454. It brought the students in touch
with the complexity of their moral intuitions. It enabled them to understand the plant
closing case as one of moral conflict, rather than a problem that could be easily solved. This
realization changed them by bringing them in touch with the viewpoints of others. The
students had identified, consciously or unconsciously, with the corporate managers, and
placed themselves in an imagined hierarchical relationship with the workers, unaware of
their own power relationship with the workers. Only when they started seeing the world
from the perspective of the workers, did their relationship with those others come into being
so that persuasion became possible. Id. at 2457-2458.
Judith Greenberg and Robert Ward used narrative to encourage the students in their
law and race class to confront both the Rodney King controversy and the more general
evidence of deeply embedded prejudice in modem society and the modem legal regime.
Judith G. Greenberg & Robert V. Ward, Teaching Race and Law Through Narrative, 30
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 323 (1995).
While Singer used a fictional narrative, the students in Greenberg and Ward's class
encountered narratives in all forms, including trial transcripts, newspaper articles, legal
commentaries, and personal anecdotes from teachers and fellow classmates. Significantly,
the first person accounts of racism the students read were the most effective in allowing the
students to feel the pain and helplessness of those subjected to racist attacks. Id. at 340.
They could thus understand, on an intuitive level, the role that race plays in the formation of
our individual identities. These first person narratives were effective in allowing the
students to connect their own identities with those of people who are a different race, and
allowed them to reach deep inside themselves for knowledge about the role of racism that
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Voicing multiple stories and experiences of subordination conveyed
particularly through first person narratives is also important to the
individual who is telling his or her story. Personal narratives carry with
them a liberating, empowering potential which is uniquely suited to redress
the traditional invalidation of outsiders by the exclusion of their stories and
perspectives from the law. As Lucie White argues, in order to "shape the
law to respond to the needs of subordinated groups, the power to tailor
must shift to those that the tailoring seeks to help. Those who have been
diagnosed as different, as disabled, must assume the power to describe their
own circumstances."
' 367
Therefore, courts should allow all the facts to be presented by the
parties; they should encourage the speech of the 'legally inarticulate' and
include it within the universe of social realities that the law
comprehends. 368 Rather than having judges and lawyers re-tell the citizen
or officer's story in the voice and from the perspective of an outside third-
person, the law should presume that each experience can be best described
by the individual who experienced it. In this way, the legal system will
empower individuals-citizens and officers alike-not only by responding
to their experiences but also by giving them a space to speak their own
words. This may allow all the parties to feel counted within the legal
system and provide the recognition and validation that are important goals
of many of those seeking legal relief3 69 and of many police officers.
Current legal narratives de-subjectivize the parties and de-
contextualize what happened outside of court. To the extent that the
individual faces a world defined by a language he or she cannot speak in
which he or she cannot locate him or herself, and which does not deal in
intelligible ways with claims he or she regards as important, the legal
discourse can be said to be "one of authority rather than community, its
force divisive rather than cohesive. 37 ° In contrast, a discourse that
embraces the language of officers and suspects gives recognition to what
each party regards as important concerns. It can thus function as an
important force of social definition and cohesion, and simultaneously
legitimize itself in the eyes of the individuals whose lives it affects the
most.
In sum, the legal discourse of the Fourth Amendment can become
empowering to the individual by letting the person's unmediated voice be
spoken, and by listening to his or her story. However, for the directive to
listen to be a meaningful normative guide rather than empty rhetoric, we
previously had been inaccessible. Id. at 341-42.
367. Lucie E. White, Lawyeringfor the Poor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 886-87 (1990).
368. See Coombs, supra note 65, at 1657.
369. Cahn, supra note 215,at 1436.
370. Coombs, supra note 335, at 1657.
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should view our commitment to voice multiplicity and diversity as part of
an expanded commitment to the true sharing of social power. Like Nancy
Ehrenreich, I see multi-perspectivity as a substantive commitment. First, it
requires a dedication to making decisions based on genuine attempts at
understanding the perspectives and social circumstances of others, to
making choices with care and humility. Second, it requires a willingness to
reach results that actually produce the sharing of power with the powerless.
We must be willing to accept the hard choices-and losses-that a true
redistribution of power would entail.37'
Search and seizure law has always been comprised of narratives and
personal stories. The trial level in particular is an arena of competing and
complementing concrete stories. Accordingly, legal actors already exercise
many of the skills necessary to comprehend the legal narratives of the
other. Lawyers and judges are frequently required to immerse themselves
in the concrete, to be sensitive to the particularities of various voices, and
to find meaning in the nonlinear or the ambiguous.372 Especially within the
realm of the Fourth Amendment, where encounters between individuals
and the police are rich in details and immensely diverse, and turn on hair-
splitting distinctions, detailed and specific narratives have always shaped
the law. 173
The problem, however, is that the law has been shaped by narrow,
one-dimensional, and oppressive narratives. The problem has not been an
overall rejection of narratives in law, but rather that only the stories of the
powerful have been listened to. David Dante Troutt argues that in the
context of police brutality prosecutions for example, these dominant
narratives construct a reality in which police discretion is overvalued and
police accounts of incredible conduct by suspects are regularly accepted.374
Because other constructions of reality, especially those presented by non-
innocent individuals, are easily dismissed as unbelievable, these dominant
authority narratives remain largely unchallenged. Moreover, these
narratives of authority and dominance are not called stories. As Catharine
MacKinnon observed, "[t]hey are called reality. ' 375 The dominant story of
an individual's conduct during an encounter with the police is presented as
the objective reality of consent; the dominant narrative of facts preceding
371. Ehrenreich, supra note 217, at 1232-33.
372. Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043-44 (1991).
373. Cf David D. Trout, Screws, Koon, and Routine Aberrations: The Use of Fictional
Narratives in Federal Police Brutality Prosecutions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 18, 26 (1999)
("[T]he difficulty of infusing narratives into the law is not that their appropriateness is
questioned. Police brutality prosecutions have long been a battleground of competing
stories.").
374. Id. at 95.
375. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law's Stories as Reality and Politics, in LAW'S STORIES:
NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW, supra note 357, at 235.
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an encounter with an individual is presented as objective reasonable
suspicion.
The fact that the law has systematically excluded some stories and
legitimized others as reality does not mean that we should now elevate the
silenced stories to the status of the only reality. Our commitment to
multiperspectivity mandates that, while we seek to voice the perspectives
of the oppressed, we do not silence the voices of police officers and other
governmental agents. We must recognize that multiple stories reflect
multiple experiences and realities. The complexity of life constitutes our
reciprocal realities, and it is the conflict between our realities that
constitutes us, whether we engage in it overtly or submerge it under a
dominant view. 37 6 We must realize that the presence of different versions
of a story does not automatically mean that someone is lying and that a
deviant version needs to be discredited.377 Stories may diverge because
they are both self-believed descriptions coming from different points of
view informed by different background assumptions and ways of making
sense of events.378 Thus, different participants may experience "what
happened" differently. 379 Instead of labeling one story as the objective
reality, each story, and hence each reality, is both objective and subjective
for the participants. In the past, the story of one reality has been dominant;
all stories must now be weighted more equitably within the legal system.38°
To acknowledge the complexity of our shared and colliding realities
also means acknowledging the impossibility of all prevailing at once. After
developing a sense of alternate perspectives, we must choose. The task is
to find a principled way to make these choices without replicating the
exclusionary impact of our current approach. The question then is how we
can choose among competing stories from the perspectives of the police
officer and the individual without invalidating the experience of the one or
the other in a way that is as oppressive as the legacy of our current
jurisprudence.
I believe we can still make fair decisions even when we are moved by
competing views. Guided generally by a posture of humility and
acknowledgement of the partiality of truths, 38' it is possible to develop
better abilities to grasp competing perspectives and to make more knowing
choices thereafter. 382 The first step is in the telling of new stories itself.383
376. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 229, at 76.
377. Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Storytelling, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2073, 2097 (1989).
378. Id. at 2082.
379. Id. at 2097.
380. Cahn, supra note 215, at 1437.
381. Minow, Stories in Law, supra note 357, at 35.
382. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 229, at 69-70.
383. Cahn, supra note 215, at 1438.
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True, stories on their own offer little guidance for evaluating competing
accounts. But, as Catharine MacKinnon observed, "[i]f the whole story has
not been told before, the principles that have been predicated on the
assumption that the story was whole cannot be unbiased principles.
384
If a story has been told only from the perspectives of police officers,
then the resulting principle of a search based on reasonable suspicion, for
example, should be suspect as oppressive because of its partiality. Hearing
new stories may cause us to pause and question our reflexive responses.
While the process of looking through other perspectives will not yield
answers to the question of which partial view to advance, it may lead to an
answer that is different from the one that would otherwise have been
reached.
We should be guided by our substantive commitment to focus on
power and subordination and by our commitment to redistribute and share
social power. Our substantive commitments do not tell us what to do but
they may and should help us select from plausible, competing choices in a
given circumstance.385 Our focus on power hierarchies may guide our
Fourth Amendment inquiry in multiple ways. It better captures the harm of
oppression that is at the core of the Fourth Amendment; it explains the
plausibility and even likelihood of competing realities of harm, especially
injurious realities; and it enables us to choose among these competing
realities. In this latter function, a jurisprudence of power is best captured in
the principles of anti-subordination and empowerment.
Critics may ask how one would know who is subordinated and who is
not. The larger question is how one knows anything in life or law.386 For
Mari Matsuda:
To conceptualize a condition called subordination is a legitimate
alternative to denying that such a condition exists. In law, we
conceptualize. We can determine when subordination exists by
looking at social indicators: wealth, mobility, comfort, health,
and survival tend to mark the rise to the top and the fall to the
depths. 3 7
Ann Scales similarly writes:
When our priority is to understand differences in perspectives
and to value multiplicity, we need only to discern between
occasions of respect and occasions of oppression. Those are
judgments we know how to make, even without a four-part test to
tell us, for every future circumstance, what constitutes
384. MacKinnon, supra note 383, at 234.
385. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 229, at 91.
386. See Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2362 (1989).
387. Id.
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domination. . . . Domination comes in many forms. Its
mechanisms are so insidious and so powerful that we could never
codify its "essence." The description that uses no formula, but
whichpoints to the moral crux of the matter, is exactly what we
need.38
Valuing the principle of anti-subordination means a serious
commitment to evaluating and eradicating all forms of oppression.389 We
should explicitly examine whether an individual was less powerful than the
police in the specific case, and whether the police exploited or benefited,
directly or indirectly, from their power over the individual. We can assume
that typically the police are more powerful than the individual, even though
this is due to the operation of social forces outside the specific encounter
and to the individual's social position. We can also assume that the police
benefit from this privileged position of power and the relative
powerlessness of the individual, even if the officer does not intentionally
exploit the vulnerability of the individual. Finally, we can assume that the
individual is subordinated at least to the extent that the police benefit from
his relative powerlessness. Consequently, the burden of persuasion should
be on the state to show that no power disparity operated to the disadvantage
of the individual, or that the individual acted out of true agency and
empowerment.
Moreover, when our conscious examination of the power structures
leaves us equally moved by the stories of the officer and the individual, we
should choose to empower the individual, if only because of the fact that
until now the jurisprudence has erred on the side of the police. In so
redistributing power, the benefit of validating and empowering those who
have thus far been denied power outweighs the losses of excess power and
privilege that the police have. Nevertheless, these are explicit moral
choices of who should carry the burden of persuasion, about whose side to
take when in doubt or when equally persuaded, and about who should gain
power and who should lose power when sharing is impossible.
This moral choice to commit to anti-subordination would hold police
officers and other governmental agents to a heightened standard in light of
the significant power they typically have over the individual due to their
authority and social legitimization. As the powerful party in a situation of
power, the police would have a moral obligation to see the world from the
point of view of those they govern or control, and to exercise their power in
the interests of the governed individual.390
388. Scales, supra note 348, at 1388.
389. See Volpp, supra note 397, at 97-98 (arguing that antisubordination is a value that
the legal system must factor into the decision whether to present testimony as to a
defendant's cultural background).
390. See Zalesne, supra note 353, at 893.
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Judges will also be bound by this heightened moral obligation. They
should consider the human consequences of their decisions rather than
hiding behind abstractions. 391 They should expressly immerse themselves
in a normative debate over questions of power instead of obscuring it with
discussions of objective reasonableness. Martha Minow also urges judges
to open their minds to the possibility that someone not like them may move
them. Such an experience will not tell them what result to reach, but it may
give them a way to forge new approaches to the problems at hand.392
Consequently, the Court should no longer focus on restrictive definitions of
a search or a seizure, and we should not let the formalities of a warrant,
probable cause, reasonable suspicion or consent determine the limits of our
inquiry into the police and individual conduct. Instead, the Court must
identify the power matrix between the parties, considering such factors as
the gender, race, and class of both the officer and the individual, and any
other factors which contribute to an imbalance of power in the specific case
at hand, such as general police practices or general attitudes about crime
and security. The Court must then determine whether such power
disparities were exploited in an impermissible way.
393
Our inquiry should not be limited to intentional exploitation of power.
Power imbalances are often invisible and appear natural. However, as long
as people are disadvantaged because of their non-white race, for example,
white people enjoy the privilege and power that accompanies whiteness.
As long as male ideology and perspective dominate the world, men enjoy
the social status and privilege of those on the top of the hierarchy,
regardless of whether they harbor personal hostility toward those beneath
them or not. This is exactly why we impose a moral obligation on the
powerful to act from the perspective of those less powerful.
This kind of inquiry may not necessarily steer our ultimate choice
along lines of what we have traditionally regarded as reason and rationality.
The stories told by the individuals involved evoke emotions that eventually
may be all that we can rely on in making our choices. This is not
something to fear. Emotions play a decisive role in helping us to
distinguish among value-laden alternatives, where each may be logical, yet
nonetheless irreconcilable. As Robin West observed:
The insistence on rational knowledge and, hence, on objects of
rational knowledge, may have blinded us to the possibilities
within the human spirit for arational and arationally (or
subjectively) acquired forms of undisciplined knowledge ...
We can, do, and should use our knowledge of the subjectivity of
391. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 229, at 89.
392. Id. at 89-90.
393. Cf Zalense, supra note 353, at 865-66 (advocating a similar approach to analyze
landlord-tenant relation in the context of hostile housing environment).
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others, sympathetically and arationally acquired.394
We should stop fearing that we will be unable to make judgments if
we embrace complexity and subjectivity. We can and do make judgments
all the time. We can and do make decisions by immersing in particulars
and by renewing our commitments to a fair world.3 95 Critics will say that
such feminist law will not work. But this is premature. Its possibilities,
wrote Catherine MacKinnon, "cannot be assessed in the abstract but must
engage the world., 396 A few decades ago, MacKinnon pointed out that
feminist theory "has barely been imagined; systematically, it has never
been tried. 397 The time has come.
394. Robin West, Disciplines. Subjectivity, and Law, in THE FATE OF LAW 119, 152
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, eds., 1991).
395. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 229, at 90-91.
396. MAcKINNON, supra note 5, at 249.
397. Id.
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